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RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS
AND DESIGN DEFECTIVENESS IN
AMERICAN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
INTRODUCTION
In May 1995, the American Law Institute (A.L.I.) adopted Tentative
Draft No. 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. Tenta-
tive Draft No. 2 ("the Draft") represents the first of two chapters of the new
Restatement, and it covers causes of action predicated on product defects
existing at the time of sale or distribution.'
Tentative Draft No. 2 was preceded by Tentative Draft No. 1, which the
Reporters for the Restatement released on April 12, 1994, and which was
scheduled for a vote at the A.L.I.'s annual meeting in May, 1994. Although
the first Draft was generally well received by the A.L.I.'s members, contro-
versy over the proposed standard for defective design liability derailed its
adoption. In particular, practitioners and academics, predominantly members
of the Plaintiffs' Bar, objected vigorously to the proposed standard, contend-
ing that it did not reflect the current state of the law.2 A memorandum
submitted to the A.L.I. asserted that 'Tentative Draft No. 1 is itself demon-
strably defective" in that it is supported by "weak, and 6ften contradictory or
irrelevant, authority.... ." Despite these allegations of error, Tentative Draft
No. 2, as adopted by the A.L.I., includes the same design defect liability
standard which was contested in Tentative Draft No. 1.
Over the past thirty years, Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts has defined American products liability law.4 Under Section 402A, a
' RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, Tentative Draft No. 2,
Introduction (1994) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 2.].
2SeeLarry S. Stewart, Plaintiffs Bar Questions Products Liability Restatement, NAT'L
L.J. (Aug. 1, 1994); ALI Hesitates on Lawyer Liability, Products Liability Restatement
Efforts, 62 U.S.L.W. 2734 (May 31, 1994).
1 See Memorandum from Howard C. Klemme, Professor Emeritus, University of
Colorado School of Law, to A.L.I. (May 31, 1994) 61 TENN. L. REV. 1173, 1175 (1994). See
also Larry S. Stewart, The ALl and Products Liability: "Restatement' or 'Reform'? TRIAL
(Sept. 1994 at 28, 29) ("It appears that the reporters may be feeling too much of the gravita-
tional pull oftort reform"); Ronald F. Banks & Margaret O'Connor, Restating the Restatement
(Second), Section 402 - Design Defect, 72 OR. L. REV. 411 (1993) (arguing that the
Restatement's proposed rule "reflects neither the evolution nor the true state of existing
products liability law.").
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
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manufacturer or distributor is held strictly liable if a product is "unreasonably
dangerous" and "defective." This determination depends upon whether the
product is in a "condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer."5
Although most states adopted this formulation either judicially6 or through
legislative enactment,7 its relevance and application to modem situations has
steadily declined s In particular, Section 402A's failure to distinguish
between claims involving manufacturing, design, and warning defects required
courts to devise appropriate standards for all three types of defects. This
dissonance played a key role in the A.L.I.'s decision to open its Restatement
(Third) of Torts with a restatement of products liability law.'
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
5Id. cmt. g.
6 See State Chart - Acceptance of Strict Liability, 1 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 4016
(Nov. 1988 & Apr. 1989). Thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia adopted the
Restatement's version of strict products liability. Seven states and Puerto Rico adopted other
variations, and Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina and Virginia have not yet
recognized strict products liability. Id. See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 16:9 (3d ed. 1987) (listing States that have adopted Restatement 2d of Torts §
402A); Id. § 16:13-:17 (listing states adopting other strict liability approaches); and Id. § 16:18
(listing states rejecting strict products liability).
7 See ARK. CODEANN. § 4-86-102 (Michie 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-3 (Bums
1992); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit 14, § 221 (West 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.920 (1988); S.C.
CODE. ANN. § 15-73-10 (Law. Co-op. 1977).
See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1513 (1992)
("[D]octrinal developments in products liability have placed such a heavy gloss on the original
text of and comments to Section 402A as to render them anachronistic and at odds with their
currently discerned objectives.") [hereinafter A Proposed Revision].
I The decision to revise Restatement (Second) of Torts was announced on March 18,
1992. The decision was reached because § 402A "has proven so influential in the development
of modem products liability law" and the existing version has become "increasingly irrelevant
and unresponsive to contemporary needs." See ALl to Begin Work on Restatement (Third);
Professors Propose Revisions to Section 402A, PROD. LIAB. DAILY (BNA) (Mar. 18, 1992);
and Law Institute Attendees Plan 5-Year Project; Members Agree on Core of Proposed
Treatise, PROD. LIAB. DAILY (BNA) (May 12, 1992). See generally James A. Henderson, Jr.
& Aaron D. Twerski, Will a New Restatement Help Settle Troubled Waters: Reflections, 42
AM. U. L. REv. 1257 (1993) (discussing issues in products liability law in need of clarification).
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Traditionally, determining design fitness has presented the most
"agitated and controversial" problems in products liability law.1" Unlike
cases involving manufacturing flaws, where courts can evaluate the challenged
product against the manufacturer's own production standards as manifested
by other units in the production line, cases of alleged design defect, where the
product is in its intended condition, do not provide a built-in objective
standard of comparison." In design cases the courts themselves must provide
an external standard or norm of defectiveness, which requires them to weigh
various engineering, marketing, and financial factors.' 2 In observing the
courts' struggle in analyzing such cases, one commentator noted that "[i]t may
now be true that [design] defect, like obscenity in Justice Stewart's definition,
will be discovered by sense impression. Unfortunately 'I know it when I see
it' will not suffice as a judicial standard for products liability."' 3 For these
reasons, some commentators have suggested that courts are inherently
10 Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 182 (Mich. 1984). See also Richard A.
Epstein, Product Liability: The Search for Middle Ground, 56 N.C. L. REV. 643, 647-49
(1978) (describing the courts' confusion in determining design defects).
" The court recognized this distinction in Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal.
1978). The court stated:
In general, a manufacturing or production defect is readily identifiable because a
defective product is one that differs from the manufacturer's intended result or from
other ostensibly identical units of the same product line.... A design defect, by
contrast, cannot be identified simply by comparing the injury-producing product
with the manufacturer's plans or with other units of the same product line, since by
definition the plans and all such units will reflect the same design.
Id. At 454. See also Prentis, 365 N.W.2d at 182. Professor Bimbaum made the following
observation on this difference:
Conscious design defect cases, however, provide no such simple test. Plaintiff is
attacking the intended design itself, arguing that the design created unreasonable
risks of harm. In attacking the product's design, the plaintiff is not impugning the
manufacturer's product as much as the manufacturer's choice of design. The use
of the term "defective condition unreasonably dangerous," therefore, creates serious
analytic problems.
Sheila L Bimbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [To Warranty]
To Strict Liability To Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593, 599-600 (1980) [hereinafter
Unmasking the Test for Design Defect].
12 See generally Birnbaum, supra note 11, at 598; James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial
Review ofManufacturers'Conscious Design Choices: The Limits ofAdjudication, 73 COLUM.
L. REV. 1531, 1577-78 (1973) [hereinafter Judicial Review].
I Aaron D. Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault- Rethinking Some
Product Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 297, 304-305 (1977) (referring to Justice
Stewart's concurrence regarding the definition of "obscenity" in Acobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
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incapable of resolving such issues, and that questions of what constitutes an
acceptably designed product are better left to the legislature.1
4
The proposed approaches for determining liability for product design
differ profoundly. First, courts and commentators are split over whether
design errors should be evaluated under traditional negligence principles, 15 or
under a distinct theory of strict liability in tort.16 Moreover, there is disagree-
ment over the appropriate standard for determining when a product is defec-
tive in design. At present, at least four distinct tests are discernible. 7 While
the Reporters' Note that accompanies the liability section in Tentative Draft
No. 2 effectively supports the proposed liability standard for defective design
by surveying these tests, it does not present an overall analysis of the stan-
dards adopted throughout all jurisdictions. Thus, despite the A.L.I.'s adop-
tion of the Draft, the question persists whether the Draft lives up to the
Reporters' promise to restate as closely as possible the existing law, or
14 See Epstein, supra note 10, at 84-88 (judges cannot make the "multiple, delicate,
marginal determinations necessary to evaluate the cost-benefit trade-off') and Henderson, Jr.,
Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits ofAdjudication,
supra note 12, at 1577-78 (establishing product safety standards is a polycentric problem best
suited for legislative response rather than judicial adjudication). But see, MARSHALL SHAPO,
THE LAW OF PRoDucTs LLAnILTY § 9.09[2], at 9-14-15 ("a [properly instructed] jury can
perform the necessary balancing test as well as any individual or agency.") and Aaron D.
Twerski et a., The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Product Liability: Design Defect Litigation
Comes ofAge, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495, 525-28 (1976) (design defect cases are not truly
polycentric and courts are competent to judge them).
15 See, e.g., Prentis, 365 N.W.2d at 186 (adopting "a pure negligence, risk-utility test in
products liability actions... where liability is predicated upon defective design."). See also
PROSSER, ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed.), § 96, at 644 (declaring that the liability of a
manufacturer for defective design rests "upon a departure from proper standards of care, so that
the tort is essentially a matter of negligence."); Birnbaum, supra note 11, at 610 ( "When a jury
decides that the risk of harm outweighs the utility of a particular design... it is saying that in
choosing the particular design and cost trade-offs, the manufacturer exposed the consumer to
greater risk of danger than he should have. Conceptually and analytically, this approach
bespeaks negligence.").
16 See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978). The court in Barker
differentiated between negligence and strict liability in the context of design defects:
It is true, of course, that in many cases proof that a product is defective in design
may also demonstrate that the manufacturer was negligent in choosing such a
design. As we have indicated, however, in a strict liability case, as contrasted with
a negligent design action, the jury's focus is properly directed to the condition of the
product itself, and not to the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct.
Id. At 457.
17 The tests applied by the court may properly be classified as Risk-Utility balancing,
Reasonable Consumer Expectations, the Barker Two-Prong test, or the Reasonably Prudent
Manufacturer test. For a discussion of each alternative, see infra Part 11.
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whether the Draft is a veiled attempt to reform American products liability
law.
The purpose of this Note, therefore, is twofold: first, to examine the
various approaches to determining liability for defectively designed products
in American products liability law; and second, to show that the Draft, as
adopted, does accurately reflect the law of a majority of states. Part I de-
scribes and analyzes the substance of the Draft's design defect standard.' 8
Part II examines the most common approaches to cases based upon claims of
defective design. This Note concludes in Part III that the Draft's standard
accurately captures and clarifies design defect law as it has developed
throughout American jurisdictions.
I
ANALYSIS OF THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
This part examines the design defect standard contained in the new
Restatement. Rather than retaining the troublesome language of strict liability
and negligence, the Reporters for the Restatement (Third) of Torts seek to
reduce the confusion surrounding the application of these doctrinal categories
to defective designs by adopting a functional approach which directly ad-
dresses the defect's nature.
A. PROPOSED LIAB]LrrY FOR DEFECIVE DESIGN UNDER THE RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
1. Introduction.
The Draft represents the first of six chapters of the Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Products Liability and covers causes of action predicated on
product defects that existed at the time of sale or distribution.' 9 Sections One
and Two of the Draft establish standards for product defectiveness. Section
One, entitled "Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor for Harm Caused
by Defective Products," imposes liability if, "at the time of sale or distribu-
tion, [the product] contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or
is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings."2 Comment a
,This Note does not address the theoretical preferability of the negligence theory of strict
liability in design defect cases. For a discussion on this topic, see Bimbaum, Unmasking the
Test for Design Defect, supra note 11; DeWolf and Allen, Liability for Manufacturers in
Washington: When Is Strict LiabilityAppropriate?, 27 GONZ. L. REv. 217 (1991/1992).
" Tentative DraftNo. 2. The subjects covered by the first chapter are "Product Defective-
ness," "Causation," and "Affirmative Defenses."
' Id., § 1, cmt. a. Section One reads:
19961
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recognizes that any rule developed for manufacturing flaws would be inappro-
priate for the resolution of claims involving the other two types of defects.
21
Accordingly, Section Two establishes three distinct standards for liability.
22
2. A Functional Approach to Product Defectiveness.
The Draft retains strict liability for cases involving manufacturing
defects.' Thus, a manufacturer or distributor of a product which departs from
its intended design is liable for any harm caused by the defect regardless of
the level of care exercised by the manufacturer or distributor in the prepara-
tion and marketing of the product. In contrast, the Draft's standards for
defective design and failure to warn defects rely on a reasonableness test
which has traditionallybeen applied in negligence cases.24 While the Report-
ers acknowledge that the latter standards are predicated on a concept of
(a) One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who
sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or
property caused by the product defect.
(b) A product is defective if, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a manu-
facturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate
instructions or warnings.
Id.
21 Id., § 1, cmt. a.
' Id., § 2. Section Two reads:
For purposes of determining Liability under § 1:
(a) a product contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its
intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and
marketing of the product;
(b) a product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable
alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commer-
cial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders the
product not reasonably safe;
(c) a product is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided
by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or other
distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the
omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.
Id.
23Tentative Draft No. 2, § 1, cmt. a.
[Vol.2:239
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS
responsibility rather than strict liability,2" they avoid making any doctrinal
distinctions. The Reporters state that, "[r]ather than perpetuating confusion
spawned by existing doctrinal categories [i.e. strict liability, negligence, and
warranty], Sections One and Two define the liability for each form of defect
in [functional] terms directly addressing the various kinds of defects." '26
Although the Draft abandons doctrinal distinctions, the Reporters
recognize that many courts insist upon using "strict liability" language in
design defect cases.2 This "rhetorical preference" stems in part from the
courts' desire to limit the defense of contributory negligence in products
liability cases and their concern that the negligence standard might be too
forgiving of a small manufacturer.' Moreover, the Reporters observe that this
preference reflects the "strict" nature of -the liability imposed on non-
manufacturing sellers, since in such cases "[ilt is no defense that [the defen-
dants] acted reasonably and were not aware of a defect in the product, be it
manufacturing, design, or failure to warn."'29 Recognizing this "rhetorical
preference," the Reporters conclude that as long as plaintiffs satisfy the
"functional criteria" of Section Two, "courts may utilize the terminology of
negligence, strict liability or the implied warranty of merchantability, or
simply define liability in the terms set forth in the black letter."30
3. Design Defects.
Section Two of the Draft defines a design defect in terms of "foreseeable
risk of harm," and the availability of a safer "reasonable alternative design."31
The definition, which is contained in Section 2(b), is as follows:
(b) A product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of
harm posed by the product could have been reduced by the adoption
of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or a predecessor in
the commercial chain of distribution and the omission of the alterna-
tive design renders the product not reasonably safe.32
§ 2, cmt c., Id.
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This section adopts a risk-utility balancing test as the standard for judging
defectiveness in product design.3 3 Specifically, the test is (1) whether at the
time of sale or manufacture there was available a reasonable and financially
practical alternative design which would have reduced the foreseeable risks of
harm posed by the challenged product, and (2) whether the manufacturer's
failure to adopt such a design rendered the product not reasonably safe.34 To
evaluate the reasonableness of an "alternative design," and to determine
whether its omission rendered the product not reasonably safe, the trier of fact
must balance the utilities of the respective designs against their inherent risks
of danger. Thus, the trier of fact must determine whether the proposed
alternative design, on balance, provides net benefits to the product. The Draft
places the burden of producing such evidence on the plaintiff.35
To aid in this analysis, comment e to Section Two provides a non-
exhaustive list of nine factors which may be considered in the balancing
process.36 In addition, the Reporters explain that it is not sufficient that the
proposed alternative design would have reduced or avoided the risk of the type
of injury suffered by the claimant if, at the same time, it would have exposed
a different class of users to risks of greater or equal magnitude. Such a design
is not considered to be "reasonable." Rather, to support a claim of defective
design, the alternative design must increase the overall safety of the product.
37
a. The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement and the
Habush Amendment.
While Section Two of the Draft requires plaintiffs to prove that adopting
an alternative design would have eliminated or reduced the overall risk of
harm inherent in the product without unreasonably diminishing its utility, it
does not require the plaintiff to produce a working prototype.38 For example,
the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by presenting qualified expert
testimony that reasonably supports the conclusion that a safer reasonable
alternative design could have been adopted at the time of sale or distribution.39
" Id., § 2, cmt. c.
34 Id.
35 id.
36 Tentative Draft No. 2, § 2, cmt. d. The nine factors are: (1) magnitude of foreseeable
risk; (2) nature and strength of consumer expectations; (3) effects of alternative design on cost
of production; (4) effects of alternative design in product function; (5) advantages and
disadvantages of the proposed safety features; (6) effects on product longevity; (7) maintenance
and repair; (8) aesthetics; and (9) marketability. Id.
37 id.
38 Id. § 2, cmt. e.
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Whether the design suggested by plaintiff's expert witness constitttes an
alternative within the meaning of this section depends generally upon the
degree of substitutability between the product as designed by the defendant
and the alternative suggested by the plaintiff.4" A manufacturer or seller will
not be liable for defective design unless the alternative suggested by the
plaintiff is a relatively close substitute for the product designed and distrib-
uted by the defendants. Once the plaintiff establishes that an alternative
design was available, the reasonableness of that design is determined by
comparing the risks and benefits of the two alternatives.4"
As contained in Tentative Draft No.1, the requirement that plaintiff
establish the availability of a reasonable alternative to the product as designed
by the defendant applied to all allegations of defective design.42 So formu-
lated, Section Two effectively insulated from challenge whole categories of
products which arguably were dangerous beyond any possible benefit to
consumers but which, by their nature, could not be redesigned to avoid or
reduce risk43 Thus, absent a manufacturing defect or an inadequate warning,
a plaintiff injured by such common and widely distributed products as
alcoholic beverages, cigarettes, firearms, and above-ground swimming pools
could not recover, unless she could establish that the risk that culminated in
her injury could have been reduced or eliminated by adopting an alternative
design without significantly effecting the social usefulness of the product. In
other words, courts could not impose liability on the manufacturers and
'0 See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier:
The Rejection ofLiabiliy J41thoutDefect, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1263 (1991). The reporters offer
the following explanation of the alternative design requirement
The variable that determines whether one is dealing with a product category or
merely a marginal design variation within a category is the degree of substitutability
of the alternative suggested by the plaintiff and the product as designed by the
defendant In traditional, intracategory design litigation, the alternative design
suggested or implicated by the plaintiff is a relatively close substitute for the product
as designed by the defendant Bicycles with slightly longer handle bars are close
substitutes for bicycles with slightly shorter handle bars. Presumably, if plaintiffs
succeeded with longer-handle bar claims, the new alternative design would
resemble so closely the older design as to be nearly a perfect substitute, thus
effectively driving the former variation, which alone would carry the burden or tort
liability, from the new bicycle market... In contrast, when a plaintiff attacks a
bicycle design on the ground that a two-wheeled cycle is inherently unsafe, the next
best alternative - a tricycle - is not a very close substitute.
Id. at 1299.
41See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
42See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, Tentative Draft No. 1, § 2.
4 See ALl Hesitates on Lawyer Liability, Products Liability Restatement Efforts, 62
U.S.L.W. 2734 (May 31, 1994) [hereinafter ALI Hesitates on Lawyer Liability].
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distributors of such products solely because they are considered by some to
have limited or negligible social utility.44 Given the unavoidable nature of the
risks inherent in the design of these products, Section Two of Tentative Draft
No. 1 would effectively bar consumers injured thereby from recovery.
Two proposals by plaintiffs' lawyer Robert L. Habush at the A.L.I.'s
May, 1994 annual meeting aimed to resolve this predicament. First, the
Institute considered an amendment which would exclude from the requirement
of reasonable alternative design products for which "the extremely high
degree of danger posed by [their] use or consumption so substantially out-
weighs its negligible utility that no rational adult, fully aware of the relevant
facts, would choose to use or consume the product."45 Although the decision
was strongly contested by some defense lawyers,4 6 the amendment was
approved and is now included in comment d to Section Two of the new
Restatement.47 Thus, comment d allows for the possibility that "the designs
of some products [may be] so manifestly unreasonable, in that they have low
social utility and high degree of danger, that liability should attach even
absent proof of a reasonable alternative design."48 However, without any
caselaw in support of its proposition, comment d is unable to suggest any
real-world products which would satisfy its rule.49 The second amendment
proposed by Habush, which sought to shift the burden of proving economic
and technological feasibility to defendants, was defeated.50
b. Consumer Expectations Rejected as an Independent Test of
Design Defectiveness.
"See, e.g., Baughn v. Honda Motor Co. Inc., 727 P.2d 655 (Wash. 1986) (refusing to
adopt a rule which would make manufacturer of mini-trail bikes strictly liable in absence of
alternative design); Patterson v. Rohin Gesellshaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (same,
addressing handguns); and Gunsalus v. Celotex Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1149 (E.D. Pa. 1987)
(same, addressing cigarettes). But see O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983)
(holding manufacturer of above-ground pool strictly liable even though no alternative design
was available).
45 See ALI Hesitates on Lawyer Liability, supra note 43.
46id.
4
' Tentative Draft No. 2., § 2(b), cmt. d.
48 id.
49The reporters offer two hypothetical situations in which comment d might apply. The
first is "a toy gun that shoots hard rubber pellets with sufficient velocity to cause injury to
children..." Id. But see, Koepke v. Crosman Arms Co., 582 N.E.2d 1000, 1001 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1989) (refusing to hold manufacturer of a properly functioning BB gun liable for resulting
injuries). The other potential situation for invoking comment d suggested by the reporters
involves an exploding cigar which explodes with sufficient heat to light the user's beard on fire
causing severe facial bums.
50 See ALI Hesitates on Lawyer Liability, supra note 43.
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The only alternative to the risk-utility test offered by the case law for
judging the fitness of product design is the so called consumer expectations
test 1 Under this test, a product is defective in design if it fails to perform as
safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or
reasonably forseeable manner. 2 Despite the test's apparent popularity, the
Draft explicitly rejects this approach as an independent and alternative
standard of design defectiveness.53 Thus, in order to recover in cases predi-
cated explicitly and solely upon defective design, a plaintiff must prove that
the manufacturer failed to adopt a reasonable and practical alternative design
which would have reduced the overall foreseeable risks of danger posed by the
product. The Draft likewise explicitly rejects consumer expectations as a bar
to recovery. This provision follows the majority approach which holds that
"[t]he mere fact that a risk presented by a product design is open and obvious,
or generally known, and that the product thus satisfies expectations, does not
prevent a finding that the design is defective."54 As a result, while a plaintiff
may not depend on consumer expectations as a means for establishing a
design defect, he will not be denied recovery merely because the product
conformed with consumer expectations about its safety.
Consumer expectations regarding the product's safety and performance
continue, however, to be relevant in two important ways. First, the Draft
retains consumer expectations as one of the factors in the risk-utility
analysis.55 In addition to presenting the required evidence of a safer reason-
able alternative, a plaintiff can argue, for example, that the foreseeable risk of
harm posed by the product was raised by the product's portrayal and market-
ing. 6 Since marketing is aimed at influencing the consumers' expectations
regarding a product's quality, the fact that the product did not live up to those
expectations is thus relevant to the determination of whether its design is
defective. Second, as discussed in the following section, consumer expecta-
tions maypermit an inference of defect where the product fails its manifestly
intended function, and the nature of the defect falls within the common
knowledge and experience of ordinary consumers.
11 See Henderson & Twerski, A Proposed Revision, supra note 8, at 1533.
52 See also Part II.C.
" Tentative Draft No. 2, § 2, cmt. f. "Under § 2(b), consumer expectations do not
constitute an independent standard for judging the defectiveness of product designs." Id.
54Id.
55ld., cmt. e.
51 Id., cmt. f "[C]onsumer expectations about product performance and the dangers
attendant to product use affect how risks are perceived and relate to foreseeability and
fiequency of the risks of harm, both of which are relevant under § 2(b).... Such expectations
are often influenced by how products are portrayed and marketed and can have a significant
impact on consumer behavior." Id.
1996]
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B. INFERENCE OF (DESIGN) DEFECT
The risk-utility test contained in Section 2(b) of the Draft is the exclusive
standard for judging the defectiveness of product designs. However, burden-
ing the injured consumer with the requirement of presenting a safer reasonable
alternative design may not only be unnecessary, but may also be unjustified
where a product fails due to its design in a manner that makes it readily
apparent to ordinary consumers. Thus, when the implicated product is a
common one and the product fails to perform its intended function, the
knowledge and expectations of the ordinary user as to the product's character-
istics, "may permit an inference that the product did not perform as safely as
it should. 57
1. Introduction.
The inference of defect is contained in Section Three of the new Restate-
ment. Section Three reads:
§ 3. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING INFERENCE OF PRODUCT
DEFECT.
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was
caused by a product defect, without proof of a specific nature of the
defect, when:
(a) the incident resulting in the harm was of a kind that ordinarily
would occur only as a result of product defect; and
(b) evidence in the particular case supports the conclusion that more
probably than not:
(1) the cause of the harm was a product defect rather than other
possible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third
persons; and
(2) the product defect existed at the time of sale or distribution.
Section Three traces its theoretical roots to the law of negligence and the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which allows an inference of negligence where
the injury could not have happened in the absence of negligence.58 As the law
5 Soule v. General Motors Corporation, 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994).
5 The application of the res ipsa loquitur ("the thing speaks for itself") doctrine does not
mean that the manufacturer will be liable regardless of fault. Rather, a product-caused injury
is deemed to be prima facie evidence of negligence, eliminating the burden of proving that the
manufacturer violated his duty of care. See generally JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D.
TWERSKI, PRoDucTs LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 18 (1987); Fleming James, Jr.,
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of products liability developed, courts realized that requiring proof of the
specific nature of the alleged defect often barred deserving plaintiffs from
recovery.59 To alleviate this perceived inequity, courts began to allow an
inference of defect where the mere fact that the product malfunctioned was
sufficient circumstantial proof of the product's defective condition.6" Thus,
in res ipsa-type situations, where the malfunction "speaks for itself," courts
relieved the plaintiff of having to prove the specific nature of the defect which
caused harm.61 Section Three recognizes the continued relevance of this
doctrine in products liability cases.
To satisfy the requirements of Section Three, the case must involve a
product which is a matter of common experience and which fails to perform
its intended function. Some courts express this requirement in terms of
consumer expectations, eliminating the necessity of proof of the exact nature
of the defect when the circumstances surrounding the product's failure were
such as to disappoint the reasonable consumer's expectations regarding the
product's performance.62 Prior drafts of the new Restatement similarly
phrased the inference in terms of reasonable consumer expectations.63 In sum,
Proof of Breach in Negligence Cases, 37 VA. L. REV. 179 (1951).
1 See; eg., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944). See generally
JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TwERsgi, PRODUCTS LiABELrrY: PROBLEMS AND
PROCESS 18 (1987).
1 See, e.g., Dietz v. Waller, 685 P.2d 744,747-748 (Ariz. 1984) ("[N]o specific defect
need be shown if the evidence, direct or circumstantial, permits the inference that the accident
was caused by a defect"); Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140, 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981) ("[It is] immaterial that the plaintiff failed to identify the specific cause of the malfunc-
tion since... the malfunction itself.., is evidence of the product's defective condition at both
the time of the injury and the time of the sale."). The inference may not, however, be drawn
from the mere fact that a product-related accident occured. See, e.g., Williams v. Smart
Chevrolet Co., 730 S.W.2d 479 (Ark. 1987) (the mere fact that a car door swung open while
the plaintiff was driving does not make out a case that the product was defective).
61 See; eg., Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 1017 (8th Cir. 1971) (plainitff need not
prove the existence of a specific defect if plaintiff can show that the product malfunctioned in
the absence of abnormal use and reasonable secondary causes); Marcus v. Anderson/Gore
Homes, Inc., 498 So. 2d 105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) ("When a product malfunctions during
normal operations, a legal inference arises that the product is defective.").
' See, e.g., Cassisi, 396 So. 2d at 1146 ("[E]vidence of the nature of an accident itself
may, under certain circumstances, give rise to a reasonable inference that the product was
defective because the circumstances of the product's failure may be such as to frustrate the
ordinary consumer's expectations of its continued performance."); Tulgetske v. R.D. Weiner
Co., 408 N.E.2d 492 (El. App. Ct 1980) (plaintiff can make out strict liability claim by proving
that the product falled to perform in a manner reasonably to be expected in light of its intended
function).
I See Council Draft No. 2., Section Six which states:
When a product fails to function as a reasonable person would expect it to function,
and causes harm under circumstances where it is more probable than not that the
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Section Three allows an inference of product defect in res ipsa-type products
liability cases - when the nature of the accident itself allows the trier of fact
to conclude that the accident would not have happened absent a defect. A
plaintiff who invokes this inference thus may need only allege that the product
failed to function as safely as a reasonable user or consumer would expect it
to function, and need not specify whether the accident was caused by a
manufacturing or design flaw.
2. Application to Design Cases
By requiring a product to fail its manifestly intended function before
allowing injured consumers to proceed under Section Three, the Reporters
intended the section to apply primarily to cases involving manufacturing
defects.64 Manufacturing defects by definition cause the product to fail its
intended function. Thus, "when a product unit contains such a defect, and the
defect affects product performance in a harmful way, in most instances it will
cause the product to fail such that the inference of defect is clear."65 Where
this is the case, Section Three provides the plaintiff with an alternative theory
of recovery that does not require him to establish the precise nature of the
defect that caused his injury.
Section Three is not, however, limited to cases predicated upon manufac-
turing flaws. Occasionally, the product's design may cause the product to
perform in an intent-defeating manner virtually identical to the result of a
manufacturing defect, thus satisfying the practical requirements of Section
Three. Such design defects would necessarily have to be inadvertent, resulting
from the manufacturer's failure to thoroughly consider all aspects of the
design.' The Reporters suggest, for example, that "an aircraft may inadver-
tently be designed in such a way that, while flying within its intended perfor-
mance parameters, the wings suddenly fall off, causing harm."67 Likewise,
bicycle brakes may be designed in a way which renders them unable to stop
the bicycle.6" Since both the aircraft and the bicycle brakes failed their
manifestly intended functions, Section Three would allow the trier of fact to
malfunction was caused by a manufacturing defect, the trier of fact may infer that
such a defect caused the malfinction and plaintiff need not specify the nature of the
defect.
Id. § 6.
' Tentative Draft No. 2, § 3, cmt. b.
65 Id.
"See generally Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review, supra note 12 at 1548.
67Tentative Draft No. 2, § 3, cmt. b.
61 Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140, 150 (N.J. 1979)
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infer a defect in light of the circumstances of the accidents.69 In contrast, an
automobile passenger, injured when the automobile's front wheel smashed
into the floorboard during an accident, may bring a design claim only under
Section 2(b).70 Under these circumstances, the proper performance of the
automobile in an accident is beyond the common experience of the ordinary
consumer and cannot be evaluated without balancing the risk and benefits of
the automobile's design.7"
3. Relation to Section 2(b) liability
Under limited circumstances, the general inference of product defect
under Section Three provides consumers injured by defective product designs
with an alternative to bringing their claims under Section 2(b). The rules of
Section Three restrict its applicability to cases where the product "fails to
perform its manifestly intended function," and is common enough so that an
ordinary consumer, based on common knowledge and experience, could
conclude that the accident would not have happened in the absence of a
defect.72 Where these requirements are met, the plaintiff may only need to
allege that the product failed to function as safely as an ordinary consumer
would expect without having to establish the specific nature of the defect.
These conditions, however, are not present in the majority of design cases
where the alleged defect is the manufacturer's failure to adopt a safer design.
Ordinarily, therefore, the plaintiff's only option in design cases is to establish
that the product was defectively designed based on the standard articulated in
Section 2(b).73
The approach to design defects proposed by the Reporters is a substan-
tial departure from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 402A. In
most cases, it requires a finding that the challenged product could have
reasonably been made safer by adopting a reasonable alternative design before
liability will be imposed. In addition, the well-known "consumer expecta-
tions" test is explicitly rejected as an independent standard of design defec-
tiveness. Despite the Reporters' assertions that these changes are warranted
69Tentative Draft No. 2, § 3, cmt b.
70 These facts are based on Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994)
(holding that the circumstances of the accident did not permit an inference that the product did
not perform as safely as it should).
71 rd.
12Tentative Draft No. 2, § 3, cmt. b. ("Section 3 claims are limited to situations where a
product fails to perform its manifestly intended function, thus triggering the conclusion that a
defect of some kind is the most probable explanation.")
1996]
254 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
by the state of existing law,74 these changes are the focus of much criticism.




While courts today unanimously hold manufacturers liable for harm
caused by "defective" products, they use a number of tests in determining
when a product is in fact defective. Some of these tests are derived from
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts; others are rooted in the
law of negligence. When applied to design defects, all of these tests implicate
some consideration of the product's value to society and the risk of danger
inherent in its design.75
A. DESIGN DEFECTIVENESS UNDER SECTION 402A.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 402A, states that one who
sells any product in a defective condition which makes the product unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer, or to his property, is subject to
liability for the harm caused by the product.76 A "defective condition" is
defined as one "not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be
unreasonably dangerous to him."' 7 Comment i similarly defines "unreason-
ably dangerous" to mean that the product "must be dangerous to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to the
product's characteristics."" Thus, both the requirement of defectiveness and
that of unreasonable danger require proof that the product was in a condition
' See Henderson & Twerksi, A Proposed Revision, supra note 8, at 1534. The co-
reporters further write:
[D]octrinal developments in products liability have placed such a heavy gloss on the
original text of and comments to Section 402A as to render them anachronistic and
at odds with their currently discerned objectives. By changing the relevant language
to conform to current understandings-by restating the Restatement-we hope to
clarify much of the confusion that has arisen over the years.
Id. at 1513.
75 See PRossERNAD KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, at 699 (5th Ed. 1984); See also, infra
notes 349-354, and accompanying text.
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A(1 965).
7Id. cmt. g.
7 Id. cmt. i.
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not contemplated by the ordinary consumer. While the circularity of these
definitions did not affect cases involving manufacturing flaws, it significantly
confused the analyses in design cases.
79
The Section 402A definition of defectiveness has proven to be problem-
atic in a number of ways when it is applied to design defects. First, Section
402A speaks of "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous" as if they are two
independent requirements, even though a finding that a product is unreason-
ably dangerous appears to imply that it is defective in design.8" Consequently,
while some courts applying this test require a plaintiff to prove both aspects
of a product's design before strict liability in tort will be imposed for product-
related injuries,8 other courts view these terms as synonymous and do not
require a plaintiff to prove defectiveness as a separate matter.8 2 Still others
have focused the inquiry on the nature of the defect, thereby dispensing with
any requirement that a defect be unreasonably dangerous.8 3 Second, reliance
on the consumer's expectations in defining a defect effectively excludes
liability in situations where the injury was caused by a condition of the
product which was apparent and obvious, since the consumer's expectations
arguably included the danger.8" In an effort not to discourage product
improvements which would reduce the risk of harm at a reasonable cost,
courts eventually abolished the "open and obvious" danger rule. 5 Third,
79 See Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56
N.C. L.REv. 643,649 (1978) (discussing the confusion generated by § 402A). See also John
W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liability for Products, 44 MIss. L.J. 825, 830-32
(1 973)[hereinafter Strict Liabilityfor Products]; 5 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF
TORTs § 28.32A, at 584-88 (2d ed. 1986).
80Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1978).
"Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976) (applying Oklahoma
law); Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1978); Byrns v. Riddell, Inc.,
550 P.2d 1065 (Ariz. 1976); Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 701 P.2d 628 (Colo. 1985).
82 Seattle-First Nat Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d 774 (Wash. 1975); Bowman v. General
Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (applying Pennsylvania law); Cassisi v.
Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. App. 1981); Burks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 633
F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying Texas law).
I See, eg., Smith v. Detroit Marine Eng'g Corp., 712 S.W.2d 472,475 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1988) (reversing judgment for defendant because trial judge instructedjury that product must
have been both defective and unreasonably dangerous; according to appellate court, either
showing is sufficient); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1155 (Cal. 1972)
(allowing recovery after finding that product was defective but not unreasonably dangerous).
4 See generally David A. Fisher, Products Liability- The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo.
L. REv. 339 (1974); Jerry J. Phillips, Products Liability: Obviousness of Danger Revisited, 15
IND. L. REV. 797 (1982). For ajudicial criticism of this test as the sole test for design defect,
see Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
11 See Theresa L. Kruk, Annotation, Products Liability: Modern Status of Rule That
There isNo Liabilityfor Patent or Obvious Dangers, 35 A.L.R. 861, 863 n.2 (4th ed. 1985);
See, e.g., Ford v. Harnischfeger Corp., 365 F. Supp. 502 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Pike v. Frank G.
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despite the widespread agreement in tort law that injured bystanders can
recover for product-related injuries regardless of privity, a literal reading of
402A would preclude recovery, because uninvolved bystanders cannot be said
to have any expectations regarding the injury-causing product.86
Perhaps the greatest challenge concerning the application of the Section
402A definition of defectiveness in a design defect case lies in determining the
expectations of an ordinary consumer regarding a product which is marketed
as intended by the manufacturer.8 No consumer can reasonably be held to
expect that a beverage bottle he is holding will shatter in his hands,8 or that
an automobile will lose its capacity to be steered. 9 In such contexts involving
manufacturing defects or inadvertent design errors, the focus of the analysis
is properly on the product, and the consumer's expectations are the logical
determinant of its defectiveness.90 What about situations where the product
was sold in the condition intended by the manufacturer and it failed during an
intended or foreseeable use? Since consumers rarely, if ever, expect to be
injured by a product, the benefit of hindsight would allow plaintiffs to
establish that the product was defective in almost every case.9 Such an
approach is unallowable, because it would render defective any design which
caused injury.92 Moreover, the tort-based requirement in Section 402A that
the product be "unreasonably dangerous" was intended to protect products
which are necessarily hazardous, such as, a knife or a handgun.9" Thus, to
prevent manufacturers from becoming absolutely liable, consumers' expecta-
tions in the context of design defects had to be defined in terms of the reason-
ableness of the danger.94
Hough Co., 467 P.2d 229, 235 (Cal. 1970); Micallef v. Miahle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 578
(N.Y. 1976).
8See PRoSSER&KEETON, ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 99, at 698 (5th ed. 1984); See, e.g.,
Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270, 1278 (8th Cir. 1972) (applying Iowa law);
Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 41 P.2d 84, 88-89 (Cal. 1969).
87 See generally Wade, Strict Liabilityfor Products, note 79, at 832-33.
88 Cf Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
'9 Cf. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
90 M. STEWART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6.1 (2d ed. 1988).
9' 'd. § 6.7.
9 Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability,
32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965) (the drafters of Section 402A could not have contemplated this
result, for "(d)efect becomes a fiction if it means nothing more than a condition causing
physical injury.").
93 See A.L.I., PROCEEDINGS 87-89 (1961); George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability:
The Original Intent, 10 Cardozo L. Rev., 2301, 2318-19 (1989).
'See, e.g., W. Page Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the
Manufacture and Design of Products,20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 563 (1969). See also
Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (at least in a conscious
[Vol.2:239
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Section 402A was written with manufacturing flaws, not design prob-
lems, in mind, and its definitions were never intended to apply to design defect
cases.95 The test is too open-ended and unstructured to guide the analysis by
the trier of fact in determining whether a product is defective in design.96 Due
to these difficulties in application, only a few courts adhere to the letter of
Section 402A in cases involving defective design.
97
B. THE RiSK-UTmny ANALYSIS TEST
Today, an overwhelming majority of courts decide design defect cases
using some form of risk-utility analysis.98 Under the risk-utility analysis,
which is at times referred to as the risk-benefit analysis test,99 the product is
defective as designed if and only if the degree. of foreseeable risk of harm
outweighs the utility or other benefits of the product.' The theory underly-
ing this test is that "virtually all products have both risks and benefits and..
. there is no way to go about evaluating design hazards intelligently without
weighing danger against utility."'' Since no product can be made completely
accident-proof, a determination of whether the product is defective in design
ultimately involves a comparison of the risks and benefits of the reasonable
alternative designs of which the manufacturer was, or should have been,
aware. 0 2 Thus, the-risk-utility test entails, in effect, a comparison of the
marginal risks and utilities affected by the proposed alternative design. °3
design choice case, the concept of defective condition standing alone is inappropriate and
misleading, and defects should be defined in terms of the unreasonableness of the danger).
s See Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, supra note 93 at 2311
(concluding that design defects were not intended to be subject to strict liability).
96 See Henderson & Twerski, A Proposed Revision, supra note 8, at 1534; W. Page
Keeton, Products Liability, Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 COLUM. L. REv.
293, 310 (1979); Gary Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L.
REV. 435,476 n.241. See, e.g., Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984); Turner
v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 851 (Tex. 1979); Heaton v. Ford Motors Co., 435
P.2d 806 (Or. 1967).
97Seegenerally Epstein, supra note 10 (discussing the confusion generated by § 402A).
See infra Part 11I.B.1.
9 West v. Johnson & Johnson Products, Inc., 220 Cal. Rptr. 437, 457 (Cal. App. 1985).
100 PROSSERAND KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS at 699 (5th Ed. 1984).
I01 Id.
102 See, e.g., Lease v. International Harvester Co., 529 N.E.2d 57 (Il. App. 1988)
(plaintiff fhiled to make out prima facie case of defective design because no evidence was
introduced as to cost of alternative design or its effect on lawn mower's utility); see also LA.
REV. STAT. § 9:2800.56 (1988) (requiring proof of reasonable alternative design); OH. REv.
CODE § 2307.75(F) (requiring proof of practical and technically feasible alternative design).
103 Henderson & Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The
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In applying the risk-utility test, courts articulate the elements of their
analysis in various ways. Under the heading of utility, the courts generally
include anything that yields benefits of some kind to the product's users and
to society, the overall need for the product, as well as the unavailability or
financial impracticality of redesigning the product to reduce the risk of
harm.4 These considerations are then balanced against any risks posed by the
design of the product of which the manufacturer knew or should have known,
the likelihood of harm, the seriousness of the harm, and the nature of the
danger."5 In order to interject some degree of regularity and structure into the
analysis of the risks and utility of a product, a number of courts adopted a set
of factors which were initially formulated by Dean John Wade. 10 6 Dean Wade
proposed that courts, in reaching a conclusion about a product's risk and
utility, should consider:
(1) the overall usefulness and desirability of the product;
(2) the safety aspects of the product;
(3) the availability of a substitute product which would meet the same
need and not be as unsafe;
(4) the manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the
product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to
maintain its utility;
(5) the user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of
the product;
(6) the user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the
product and their avoidability; and
(7) the manufacturer's ability to spread the loss by setting the price of
the product or carrying insurance.
Expanding on Dean Wade's analytical protocol, courts have articulated
additional factors which may properly be considered in making a risk-utility
analysis in a design defect case. These factors have been variously stated to
be:
(8) the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design;
10 7
Rejection ofLiability without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263 (1991).
' See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978); Owens v. Allis-
Chalmers Corp., 326 N.W.2d 372 (Mich. 1982); Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176
(Mich. 1984). See also W. Page Keeton, Products Liability - Design Hazards and The
Meaning of Defect, 10 COLUM. L. REv. 293, 314(1979).
"OS O'Brien v. Muskin Corp, 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983). See also Keeton, Products
Liability-Design Hazards and The Meaning of Defect, supra note 104.
10 See Wade, StrictLiabilityfor Products, supra note 79 at 837-838. For courts which
adopted the Wade factors, see, e.g., Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 386 A.2d 816 (N.J.
1978); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983); Prentis v. Yale Mfg.
Co., 365 N.W.2d 176 (Mich. 1984).
"' See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978); Owens v. Allis-
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(9) the likelihood and probable seriousness of the danger;1 8
(10) the financial cost of the proposed safer design;10 9
(11) the adverse consequences to the product and to the consumer that
would result from the proposed alternative design;10
(12) public knowledge and expectations of the product's danger;"'I
(13) the state of the art at the time of manufacture;" 2 and
(14) whether the challenged product is an essential or a luxury item."
3
The trier of fact is not required to consider all of the factors enumerated
above in evaluating every allegation of defective design. 114 Rather, the trier of
fact only needs to balance those factors which are relevant under the facts of
the particular case.I" The risk-utility test therefore defines safe products as
those whose utility and other benefits outweigh the foreseeable risk of harm,
"provided that risk has been reduced to the greatest extent possible consistent
with the product's continued utility."' 6 This determination must be based on
the particular facts of each case." 7
1. Safer Alternative Design Requirement- Categorical
Liability Rejected
Chalmers Corp., 326 N.W.2d 372 (Mich. 1982); Ford Motor Co. v. Nowak, 638 S.W.2d 582
(Tex. App. 1982).
"' See, e.g., Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983); Knitz v.
Minister Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio 1982); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443
(Cal. 1978).
" See, ag., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978); Fox v. Ford Motor Co.,
575 F.2d 774 (Wyo. 1978); Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc. 644 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. 1982).
"'Se- e.g., Byms v. Riddell, Inc., 550 P.2d 1065 (Ariz. 1976); Cepeda v. Cumberland
Eng'g Co., 386 A.2d 816 (N.J. 1978); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Or.
1974).
' Sep- eg., Byms v. Riddell, 550 P.2d 1065 (Ariz. 1976); Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709
P.2d 876 (1985).
12 See, e.g., O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 305 (N.J. 1983). (stating that
"state-of-the-art evidence is relevant to, but not necessarily dispositive of, risk-utility analysis.").
13 See, e.g., id. at 306. "The evaluation of the utility of a product also involves the
relative need for that product; some products are essentials, while others are luxuries. A
product that fills a critical need and can be designed in only one way should be viewed
differently from a luxury item." Id.
"4 See, e.g., Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204,209 (N.Y. 1983).
"'See, e.g., Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 959 (1980) (applying New Jersey law).
"6 Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 477 A.2d 539, 544 (1982).
... See, e.g., O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983).
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A relevant factor in every design case is the manufacturer's ability to
reduce the foreseeable risk of harm by adopting a reasonable alternative
design. ' Some courts have held that notwithstanding its relevancy and
admissibility in design cases, proof of the feasibility of an analternative design
is not necessary in all cases. 9 The majority of jurisdictions, however, require
proof thereof either by statute2  or judicial decision.' Thus, courts have
insisted that plaintiffs introduce evidence that a safer design was sci-
entifically'2 or mechanically feasible, 2 1 or that a safer substitute product was
available. 4 In addition, they have held that plaintiff should present evidence
of the fmancial cost of a safer alternative, 2 ' as well as any adverse conse-
quences of the proposed design, such as its affect on other types of risk.
2 6
". See infra Part III.B.2.
"'O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983); Seward v. Griffin, 452 N.E.2d
558 (fI1. App. Ct. 1983); Mitchell v. Freuhauf Corp., 568 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1978) (applying
Texas law); Rahmig v. Mosley Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56 (Neb. 1987); Halphen v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986); Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143
(Md. 1985).
120 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.56 (1988) (requiring proof of reasonable altema-
tive design); OH. REV. CODE § 2307.75(F) (1995) (requiring proof of practical and technically
feasible alternative design); N.J. STAT. § 2A:58C-3 (1990).
121 See, e.g., Townsend v. General Motors Corp., 642 So. 2d 411 (Ala. 1994); Banks v.
ICI Americas, 450 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. 1994); Hughes v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 294
(Iowa 1994); Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 36 F.2d 278 (3rd. Cir. 1994) (applying Pennsylva-
nia law); Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 326 N.W.2d 372 (Mich. 1982); Voss v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co. 450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983); Toliver v. General Motors Corp., 482 So. 2d
213 (Miss. 1985); Hull v. Eaton Corp., 825 F.2d 448 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (applying District of
Columbia law); Smith v. Keller Ladder Co., 645 A.2d 1269 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1994); Wilson
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978); Lease v. International Harvester Co., 529
N.E.2d 57 (Ill. App. 1988); Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175 (Colo. 1992); Kotler v.
American Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1990) (applying Massachusetts law); Allen v.
Minnstar, Inc., 8 F.3d 1470 (Utah 1993).
i2 See, e.g., Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 644 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982), rev'd on
other grounds, 650 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. 1983).
"2' See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g, 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978); Voss v. Black & Decker
Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983); Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio
1982). But see, Allen v. Minnstar, Inc., 8 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir, 1993) (applying Utah law)
(holding that plaintiffs burden is not satisfied merely by proof that a prototype of the proposed
alternative design existed).
124 See, e.g., Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876 (Ariz. 1985); Voss v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322
(Or. 1978).
" See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g, 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978); Voss v. Black & Decker
Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983); Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 326 N.W.2d 372
(Mich. 1982); Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 644 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982), rev'd on
other grounds, 650 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. 1983).
12 See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g, 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978); Owens v. Allis-Chalmers
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Thus, to be reasonable, the proposed alternative must be not only economi-
cally and mechanically feasible, but it must also result in a reduction of the
overall magnitude of risk.
The burden of introducing evidence on the feasibility and reasonableness
of a safer alternative design usually falls on the plaintiff who challenges the
design. 7 While it is not necessary for the plaintiff to offer evidence on each
of the points mentioned above,128 he does not fulfill his burden of proof by
merely asserting that the proposed design would have reduced the risk of
harm.2 9 In most jurisdictions, therefore, the plaintiff is required to present
evidence on at least one of theaforementioned points. 30 Nevertheless, a few
courts have held that once the plaintiff has established that the design was a
proximate cause of his injuries, the manufacturer must prove that a safer
reasonable alternative did not exist.' As a practical matter, however,
plaintiff's proof of proximate causation will almost always include evidence
of a reasonable alternative design.1
32
The bulk of defective design cases involve individual products for which
alternative designs are at least conceptually available. The inquiry changes,
however, when the plaintiff attempts to convince the court to extend liability
for defective design to a whole product category, such as handguns or ciga-
rettes. 33 Due to the nature of these claims, no alternative design can be
proven or alleged. 34 Despite the frequency with which these arguments are
made, only a few courts have been receptive to the idea of categorical
liability. 35 The landmark case in this area is O'Brien v. Muskin Corp.136 In
Corp., 326 N.W.2d 372 (Mich. 1982); Cremeans v. International Harvester Co., 452 N.E.2d
1281 (Ohio 1983).
27 See infra Part Ill.B.2.
' See, ag., Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 644 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982), rev'd on
other grounds, 650 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. 1983).
129 See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Nutt, 407 A.2d 606 (D.C. App. 1979).
3See ag., Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 644 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982), rev'don
other grounds, 650 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. 1983).
" Sep_ eg., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Barker v. Lull
Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
See eg., Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 96 n.6 (Minn. 1987) ("Examina-
tion of our cases... [alleging] defective design demonstrates that, as a practical matter,
successful plaintiffs, almost without fail, introduce evidence of an alternative safer design.").
'1 See ag., Maguire v. Pabst Brewing Co., 387 N.W.2d 565, 570 (Iowa 1986) (holding
that beer is not an unreasonably dangerous product).
"' Id. The claim alleged that beer itself, not just a specific brand, is unreasonably
dangerous, but there is no true substitute for beer.
131 O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983); Halphen v. Johns-Mansville
Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 113 (La. 1986); Kelly v. R.G. Inds.,. 497 A.2d 1143, 1146 (Md.
1985). See generally Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier, supra note 40, at 1273
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that case, the plaintiff was injured when he struck his head on the bottom of
an above ground swimming pool. The trial judge refused to allow the jury to
consider plaintiff's design-defect claim, which alleged that the pool's slippery
vinyl liner was defective, because plaintiff's expert could not propose a viable
substitute for the vinyl liner. On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court
reversed, holding that "[a] product may be defective and unreasonably
dangerous even though there are no alternative, safer designs available."'37
Thus, even in the absence of a reasonable alternative design the jury was
entitled to find that "the risk posed by the [product] outweighed its utility.'
'I3
Similar advances have been made by plaintiffs in Maryland 139 and
Louisiana.140 In each of these cases, however, the legislatures of the respec-
tive states have enacted statutes overturning the courts' decisions and reinstat-
ing the requirement that a reasonable alternative design be proven as part of
a design-defect claim."' As a result, no jurisdiction currently applies the
rationale of O'Brien in design defect cases. 142
2. Habush Amendment-An Empty Set
Courts have not yet had the opportunity to decide whether proof of a
reasonable alternative design is necessary to maintain a claim of defective
design against a product with negligible utility and a high risk of harm.143
Moreover, it is doubtful whether an actual product would possess the charac-
(discussing difficulties inherent in a court's implementation of categorical liability).
"' O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983).
1371Id.
13' Id. at 306.
13' Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 497 A.2d 1143, 1146 (Md. 1985).
"4 Halphen v. Johns-Mansville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 113 (La. 1986).
141 See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.56(1) (West 1991); N.J. Star. Ann. § 2A:58C-3
(West 1989); Md. Code Ann. 27, Section 36-I (1942) (prohibiting the imposition of strict
liability for injuries resulting from criminal use of a firearm).
142 See generally Tentative Draft No. 2 (1994), § 2 cmt. c; Henderson & Twerski,
Closing the Frontier, supra note 40.
' Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, Council Draft No. 2, § 2 cmt. c
(September 3, 1994).
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teristics necessary to invoke the exemption.'" Such an exemption has,
however, been proposed in dictum by a number of courts.
The Oregon Supreme Court in Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp.'4 was the
first to indicate that proof of a reasonable alternative design might not be
necessary in instances where a product has both a high degree of risk and a
very low level of social utility.14 In Wilson, plaintiff brought a claim alleging
that the design of an airplane engine manufactured by the defendant was
defective. In its decision, the Court focused on the practicability of a safer
alternative design introduced by the plaintiff, and it concluded that the
evidence presented was insufficient to prove that the alternative was "not only
technically feasible but also practicable in terms of cost and the overall design
and operation of the product."'147 The court refused to submit the claim to the
jury, and it emphasized that, in Oregon, presenting such evidence "is part of
the requiredproofthat a design feature is a 'defect'....," 4 s Nevertheless, in
an often-cited footnote, the court left open the prospect of liability without an
alternative design:
... There might be cases in which the jury would be permitted to
hold the defendant liable on account of a dangerous design feature
even though no safer design was feasible (or there was no evidence
of a safer practicable alternative.) If, for example, the danger was
relatively severe and the product had only limited utility, the court
might properly conclude that the jury could find that a reasonable
manufacturer would not have introduced such a product into the
stream of commerce. We hold here only that, given the nature of the
defects alleged, it was improper to submit the issue of a defect in the
engine design to the jury in the absence of appropriate evidence that
the safer alternative design was practicable.
49
Since the Reporters are unable to support the exception with case law, they instead
offer two examples of products which in their opinion would satisfy the manifestly unreason-
able design standard. The first example involves a "toy gun that shoots hard rubber pellets with
sufficient velocity to cause injury to children...." But see Koepke v. Crosman Arms Co., 582
NXE.2d 1000, 1001 (Ohio Ct App. 1989)(refusing to apply strict liability to properly function-
ing BB gun). The other example involves an exploding cigar that generates enough heat to
cause serious bums.
'4' 577 P.2d 1322, 1328 n.5 (Or. 1978)
146Id.
147 Id. at 1326-27.
14" Id. at 1327 [emphasis added].
14' Id. at 1358 n. 5.
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The Wilson footnote has been echoed in decisions from other states, but
it has never been utilized. In Armentrout v. FMC Corp.,"15 the Colorado
Supreme Court cited Wilson for the proposition that although proof of a
"feasible alternative is a factor in the risk-benefit analysis of the unreasonable
dangerousness of the product," such evidence "is not always necessary."
151
Similarly, although Minnesota courts require plaintiffs to show the existence
of a safer alternative design as part of a defective design claim, 5 2 the Minne-
sota Supreme Court in Kallio v. Ford Motor Co. '53 relied on Wilson for its
statement that "[c]onceivably, rare cases may exist where the product may be
judged dangerous because it should be removed from the market rather than
redesigned." '154 The Colorado and Minnesota courts' express reliance on
Wilson suggests that courts have reserved this exception to the reasonable
alternative design requirement for those cases where the product has negligi-
ble utility and exceedingly high risk.
3. Strict Liability and Negligence
While the theoretical roots of the risk-utility test are found in traditional
negligence principles,' numerous courts have "attempted to avoid both the
notion of fault implicit in negligence and the harshness of no-fault implicit in
absolute liability."'5 6 These efforts to develop a distinct theory of strict
liability in tort for product-related harm continue to define the restless role
negligence plays in strict products liability actions.
a. Risk-Utility Analysis With Knowledge of Dangers and
Developments Imputed at the Time of Trial
For many courts, the distinction between the risk-utility test applied in a
negligence case and the risk-utility test applied in a strict liability case is the
character of knowledge attributed to the defendant. In a negligence action, the
plaintiff must prove that the manufacturer acted unreasonably in designing the
product, given what the manufacturer knew or should have known about the
150 842 P.2d 175 (Colo. 1992).
"' Id. at 185 n. 11.
112 Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 93 (Minn. 1987).
153 Id.
1541d. at 97 n. 8. See also Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1328 n.5 (Or.
1978).
... See Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 184 (Mich. 1984) (risk-utility test is
based on Judge Hand's formulation of the negligence standard in United States v. Carroll
Towing 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
156 Prentis, 365 N.W.2d at 185.
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risks it posed.157 In contrast, courts claiming to apply strict liability shift the
focus of the analysis from the manufacturer designing the product to the
product itself' 5 They accomplish this shift in focus by imputing to the
manufacturer knowledge of all product risks, technological advances and uses
as they are available at the time of trial.'59 The manufacturer will not,
however, be held liable if, at the time the product was sold, the risks were
scientifically unknowable.' 6 ° The test then becomes whether a reasonable
manufacturer with knowledge of scientifically ascertainable danger inherent
in the product at the time it was sold, would nonetheless have marketed the
product. 161
By evaluating a product's condition at the time of trial, these latter courts
burden the manufacturer with knowledge of the product's dangerous condition
as a matter of law, obviating the need for a plaintiff to prove knowledge as a
matter of fact.162 Therefore, the fact that the nature of a plaintiff's harm was
' 5 See, e.g., Prentis, 365 N.W.2d at 184. See generally Prosser & Keeton On Torts §
96 at 688-89 (5th ed. 1984) (A product is negligently designed if"a reasonable person would
conclude that the magnitude of the reasonably foreseeable harm as designed outweighed the
utility of the product as so designed.") (emphasis added); Comment, Foreseeability in Product
Design and Duly to Warn Cases-Distinctions and Misconceptions, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 228
(1968).
158 See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 624 P.2d 790, 794 (Alaska 1981); Dart v.
Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 881 (Ariz. 1985); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443,
457 (Cal. 1978); Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 835 (Iowa 1978).
The Arizona Supreme Court stated the difference as follows:
ITnhere is a fundamental difference in the application of a risk benefit analysis in a
negligent design case and the same analysis in a strict liability design case. The
difference is significant for it shifts the central focus of the inquiry from the
conduct of the manufacturer (negligence) to the quality of the product (strict
liability). Negligence theory concerns itself with determining whether the conduct
of the defendant was reasonable in view of the foreseeable risk of injury; strict
liability is concerned with whether the product itself was unreasonably dangerous.
Dart, 709 P.2d at 880.
' See, e.g., Jackson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber, Co., 788 F.2d 1070, 1084 (5th Cir.
1986) (applying Texas law); Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613, 629-30 n.14
(8th Cir. 1983).
"6 See, ag., Heritage v. PioneerBrokerage & Sales, 604 P.2d 1059, 1064 (Alaska 1979).
Seag., Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986); Cepeda
v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 386 A.2d 816(1978), overturned on other grounds, Suter v. San
Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140 (N.J. 1978); Bohm v. Triumph Corp., 422
N.Y.S.2d 969 (N.Y. App. 1979); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974).
"See, e.g., Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876 (Ariz. 1985); Barker v. Lull Eng'g
Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974).
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unforeseeable at the time of manufacture, while precluding recovery for
negligent design, will not absolve the manufacturer of strict liability if, with
the benefit of hindsight, the trier of fact determines that a reasonable manufac-
turer would have remedied the danger before the product was sold. 63 In two
jurisdictions, courts have taken strict liability even further and have held that
the manufacturer's knowledge is totally irrelevant to the issue of liability.
164
b. Risk-Utility Analysis With Knowledge at Time of Sale or
Manufacture
In applying the risk-utility test for design defects, some courts focus on
the product's condition at the time of sale or manufacture. These courts
analyze such factors as the overall utility and other benefits of the product,
and the cost and availability of safer alternative designs. They balance these
against the inherent risks of which the product's manufacturer knew or should
have known. 65 Courts hold a manufacturer responsible for the degree of
knowledge and skill of an expert at the time of sale or manufacture.
166
Assessing a product's design in this manner necessarily involves analyzing
the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct in designing and distribut-
ing the product. As such, the inquiry differs little from traditional negligence
analysis. 167
"6 See Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 208 (N.Y. 1983). See also
James A. Henderson, Jr., Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design:
Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REv. 773, 777 (1978-
1979); Wade, Strict Tort Liability for Products, supra note 79.
164See Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co., Inc., 391 A.2d 1020, 1027 (Pa. 1978) (product
can be found defective where it "left the supplier's control lacking any element necessary to
make it safe for its intended use .... ) and Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods Corp., 447 A.2d
539 (N.J. 1982) (holding manufacturer strictly liable despite the fact that risks were scientifi-
cally unknowlabe at the time of sale or distribution). In New Jersey, Beshada has been limited
to asbestos cases only. Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984). For criticism of
this approach, see Henderson & Twersiki, Closing the Frontier, supra note 40; Birnbaum,
supra note 11.
161 See, e.g., Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697 F.2d 1192, 1197 (4th Cir. 1982)
(applying South Carolina law); Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, Inc., 604 P.2d 1059
(Alaska 1979).
"See, e.g., Kaijala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir. 1975)
(applying Minnesota law); Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th
Cir. 1973) (applying Texas law), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
1
17 See, e.g., Prentis v. Yale Mfg., 365 N.W.2d 176, 184 (Mich. 1984). See generally
John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to
Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 734 (1983).
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The Michigan Supreme Court in Prentis v. Yale Manufacturing Co.,161
openly acknowledged that design defect liability is essentially a matter of
negligence. Prentis involved a claim against a forklift manufacturer for
failure to equip the forklift with a seat or a platform for the operator's use.
169
In reviewing the claim, the court took the position that risk-utility analysis of
a product's design always involves an assessment of the decisions made by
the manufacturer in designing the product. 7 According to the Prentis court,
the issue in a design defect case is whether the manufacturer "properly
weighed the alternatives and evaluated the trade-offs and thereby developed
a reasonably safe product."" ' While the court noted that many courts
distinguish between negligence and strict liability cases applying the risk-
utility test on the basis of imputed knowledge, it concluded that "on a closer
examination [the distinction] appears to be nothing more than semantics."
172
Accordingly, the court adopted a pure negligence, risk-utility test for product
liability actions predicated upon defective design.
173
C. REASONABLE CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS
Although many courts have expressly rejected the consumer expectations
test in design defect cases,174 a substantial number of courts continue to define
"defective" in terms of whether the product meets the reasonable expectations
of the consumer or user regarding its safety.' 75 This test, also referred to in
some jurisdictions as the ordinary consumer expectations test, 176 is at times
161 365 N.W.2d 176 (Mich. 1984).
69 Id. at 179.
'7 Id. at 184.
' Id. at 184 (quoting Aaron Twerski et al., Shifting Perspectives in Products Liability:
From Quality to Process Standards, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 347, 359 (1980)).
1721d. at 184.
'7 d. at 186.
174See ag., Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 851 (Tex. 1979); Bilotta
v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 621 (Minn. 1984); Prentis v. Yale Mfg., 365 N.W.2d 176,
184 (1984); Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240 (Colo. 1987); Sperry-New Holland
v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248 (Miss. 1993).
1 See, e.g., Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 641 P.2d 353 (1982); Rahmig v. Mosley
Machinery Co., 412 N.W.2d 56 (Neb. 1987); Ewen v. McLean Trucking Co., 706 P.2d 929
(Or. 1985); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 406 A.2d 1254 (Conn. 1979);
Taylor v. Gerry's Ridgewood, Inc., 490 N.E.2d 987 (Ill. App. 1986); Aller v. Rodgers Mach.
Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1978); Bemis Co. v. Rubush, 427 N.E.2d 1058 (Ind.), cert
denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1981); Seattle-First Nat. Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d 774 (Wash. 1975).
,' 6 See, e.g., Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 406 A.2d 1254 (Conn.
1979).
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held out as the sole test of liability,177 or as an alternative to the risk-utility
analysis. 7 s While for some of these courts this test is the result of the
definitions contained in the Restatement (Second), Section 402A, comment
i,'79 other courts apply it notwithstanding their rejection of Section 402A. 110
The seemingly wide acceptance of the reasonable consumer expectations
formulation of the design defect standard obscures its actual importance in
design defect cases. The manner in which courts apply this test limits its
significance in two critical ways: (1) For most courts, the determination of
whether the expectations of the consumer are reasonable depends upon some
sort of balancing of the product's risk and utility and the feasibility of
designing the product in a safer way;'' and (2) in many of the jurisdictions
that retain the test as an independent determinant of design defectiveness, its
application is limited to cases where the defect is simple and can be under-
stood on the basis of common knowledge. "2 Therefore, little, if any, substan-
tive inconsistency exists between the new Restatement's risk-utility analysis
test and the consumer expectations standard applied in these jurisdictions.
1. Determining When Expectations are "'Reasonable"
Many courts that define defective design in terms of the reasonable
expectations of the ordinary consumer weigh the product's risk and utility in
determining the reasonableness of those expectations.8 3 In announcing the
proper test for these cases, the Supreme Court of Iowa in Aller v. Rodgers
" See, e.g., Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 641 P.2d 353 (1982); Rahrnig v. Mosley
Machinery Co., 412 N.W.2d 56 (Neb. 1987).
17 See, e.g., Shields v. Outboard Marine Corp., 776 F. Supp. 1579 (M.D. Ga. 1991)
(applying Florida law); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 624 P.2d 790 (Alaska 1981); Dart v.
Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876 (Ariz. 1985); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal.
1978); Duke v. Gulf W. Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. App. 1983).
"See, e.g., Bemis Co. v. Rubush, 427 N.E.2d 1058 (Ind. 1981); Lester v. Magic Chef,
Inc., 641 P.2d 353 (Kan. 1982); Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371
(Mo. 1986); Rahmig v. Mosley Machinery Co., 412 N.W.2d 56 (Neb. 1987).
'S e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 624 P.2d 790 (Alaska 1981); Barker v. Lull
Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
"' See infra notes 183-198 and accompanying text.
"1
2 See infra notes 199-215 and accompanying text.
"n See, e.g., Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d 774 (Wash. 1975); Aller v.
Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 834 (Iowa 1978); Hebert v. Brazzel, 403 So. 2d
1242 (La. 1981); Fabian v. E.W. Bliss Co., 582 F.2d 1257 (10th Cir. 1987) (applying New
Mexico law); Lease v. International Harvester Co., 529 N.E.2d 57 (111. App. Ct. 1988); Light
v. Weldarc Co. Inc., 569 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. App. 1990).
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Machinery Manufacturing Co.,'8 4 and the Florida Supreme Court in the
similar case of Radiation Technology, Inc., v. Ware Const. Co., ' held that
the issue of 'reasonableness' should be determined by weighing the probabil-
ity and gravity of danger against the social utility of the product."8 6 In Aller,
the court noted that this process of balancing is the same as that conducted in
negligence cases.
8 7
Thus, while the language is different, the substance of the tests adopted
by these courts is identical to a risk-utility analysis. Indeed, some courts have
explicitly recognized this point. The Washington Supreme Court in Baughn
v. Honda Motor Co.' characterized the test as "a consumer expectations test
with a risk-utility base,"'8 9 and the Oregon Supreme Court in Phillips v.
Kimwood Machine Co.9 ' explained the subtle connection as follows:
To elucidate this point further, we feel that the two standards are
the same because a seller acting reasonably would be selling the
same product which a reasonable consumer beleves he is purchasing.
That is to say, a manufacturer who would be negligent in marketing
a given product, considering its risks, would necessarily be market-
ing a product which fell below the reasonable expectations of
consumers who purchase it.191
Like the jurisdictions that expressly apply the risk-utilty test, these courts
consider evidence of a safer, cost-effective alternative design in determining
whether reasonable consumer expectations have been met.192
'84268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1978).
i5445 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1983).
6Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d at 834-35 ("The article sold must be
dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be expected by the ordinary consumer...
.Proof ofunreasonableness involves a balancing process. On one side of the scale is the utility
of the product and on the other side is the risk of its use."); Radiation Technology, Inc. v. Ware
Constr. Co., 445 So. 2d at 331 ("The term 'unreasonably dangerous' more accurately depicts
liability of a manufacturer or supplier in that it balances the likelihood and gravity of potential
injury against the utility of the product...
"7 Aller, 268 N.W.2d at 835.
i81727 P.2d 655 (Wash. 1986).
"s Id. at 660 ("While usually called a 'consumer expectations' test, the Tabert rule
actually combines the consideration of consumer expectations with an analysis of the risk and
utility inherent in the product's use.").
190 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974).
191 Id. at 1037 (emphasis added). But see Bums v. General Motors Corp., 891 P.2d
1354, 1357 (Or. Ct App. 1995) (stating that "the distinction between the consumer expectation
and reasonable manufacturer tests is not merely academic").
192 See Radiation Technology, 445 So. 2d at 331; Aller, 268 N.W.2d at 835; Seattle-First
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Moreover, even courts that expressly reject use of the risk-utility test in
evaluating design defects will in fact weigh the risk and utility inherent in the
product to determine whether it is unreasonably dangerous. In Sumnicht v.
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., '93 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin distin-
guished between the two alternative tests and concluded that "Wisconsin is
committed to the consumer-contemplation test for determining whether a
product is defective."' 9 4 The court nevertheless cited with approval another
court's list of five relevant factors which may be weighed as part of the test.195
While the court characterized the factors as "clearly permissive, '196 it went on
to consider a number of them in afffiming the judgment for plaintiff. 97 In
summary, for many of the courts that apply the reasonable consumer expecta-
tions test, some kind of a risk-utility analysis is necessary to determine what
a consumer can reasonably expect. In these jurisdictions, the tests "may be
but two sides of the same coin.'
98
2. Limitation to Simple and Obvious Defects
A handful of jurisdictions retain consumer expectations and risk-utility
as two distinct tests, but limit the application of the consumer expectations
test to obvious design defects.' 99 The approach taken by the California courts
in Soule v. General Motors Corp.200 and Lunghi v. Clark Equipment Co.2
0 1
illustrates this functional division. In both cases the courts concluded that the
consumer expectations test in design defect litigation, while an alternative
Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (Wash. 1975).
"' 360 N.W.2d 2 (Wis. 1984).
1941d. at 15.
1951d. at 17. The five factors suggested in Collins v. Ridge Tool Co., 520 F.2d 591, 594
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 949 (1976), are (1) conformity of defendant's design
to the practices of other manufactures; (2) the open and obvious nature of the alleged danger,
(3) the extent and length of time the product was used before the alleged injury occurred; (4)
the manufacturer's ability to cost-effectively eliminate the danger without impairing the
product's utility; and (5) the relative likelihood of injury.
196 Id.
..7 Id. at 16-19.
'1 Estate of Ryder v. Kelley-Springfield Tire Co., 587 P.2d 160, 164 (Wash. 1978).
'99 See, e.g., Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876 (Ariz. 1985); Soule v. General
Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994); Duke v. Gulf& Western Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 404
(Mo. App. 1983).
20 882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994).
201 200 Cal. Rptr. 387 (Cal. App. 1984).
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means of analysis, is inappropriate whenever the issue of design defect goes
beyond common knowledge and experience.2"2
Both Soule and Lunghi involved appellate review of the propriety of
instructing the jury on the consumer expectations test, the former in an action
for enhanced injuries suffered during an automobile accident, and the latter in
a suit against the manufacturer of a Bobcat gravel loader.20 3 In Lunghi, the
court held that in a design defect case the proper test depends on "whether the
subject of inquiry is one of such common knowledge that [persons] of
ordinary education could reach a conclusion as intelligently as" would an
expert.2 The court concluded that the common knowledge and experience of
the ordinaryperson does not include the capacity to evaluate a Bobcat opera-
tor's expectations regarding the loader's safety.205 The court affirmed the trial
court's decision to instruct the jury only on the risk-utility test.
2 6
Several additional California Court of Appeals cases considered this
point, and reached conflicting conclusions.2 7 Finally, the California Supreme
Court settled the issue in Soule, and sided with the Lunghi court. The
plaintiff in Soule claimed that the design of her car was defective in that it
allowed its front wheel to break free during an accident, collapse rearward,
and smash the floorboard into her feet.20 This theory of design defect
involved considerations of technical and mechanical detail which were beyond
the common experience of car owners.20 9 The court concluded that in such
cases the product's design had to be evaluated by weighing the design's utility
and benefits against its inherent risk of danger, including "the manufacturer's
evidence of competing design considerations."210 The court reserved the
consumer expectations test "for cases in which the everyday experience of the
202 Soule, 882 P.2d at 308; Lunghi, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
203 Soule, 882 P.2d at 301; Lunghi, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
24 Lunghi, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 393 (citing People v. Cole, 301 P.2d 854 (1956)).
205 Id.
2"Id. at 393.
2 For cases agreeing with Lunghi, see Bates v. John Deere Co., 195 Cal. Rptr. 637, 645
(Cal. App. 1983) ("[w]e, too, find it difficult to apply the... [consumer expectations] test to
these facts, in part because it is difficult to conceive that an ordinary consumer would know
what to expect concerning the safety design of a commercial cotton picker")., and Rosburg v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 226 Cal. Rptr. 299, 304 (Cal. App. 1986) (breast implant
performance is beyond common experience of ordinary perople). For cases disagreeing with
Lunghi, and applying the test regardless of the nature of the product, see Akers v. Kelly Co.,
219 Cal. Rptr. 513, 524 (Cal. App. 1985) (consumer expectations test appropriate where the
accident involved a "dockboard," a spring-loaded plate which attached to a loading dock) and
West v. Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc., 220 Cal. Rptr. 437.
20 Soule, 882 P.2d at 301.
209 1d. at 310.
210 Id. at 308.
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product's users permits a conclusion that the product's design violated
minimum safety assumptions. ' 1 '
Likewise, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that in a design defect
case, the appropriate test depends on the nature of the defect which caused the
2121 hinjury. While the court held that design defect cases should be resolved,
whenever possible, upon the consumer expectations test, it acknowledged that
the test is inherently limited to claims involving defects which are within the
common experiences of individuals." 3 Where the consumer would not know
what to expect, the court adopted the risk-utility test together with Dean
Wade's seven factors. 14 These courts recognized the limitations of the
consumer expectations test in a technologically advanced society: "In many
situations... the consumer would not know what to expect, because he would
have no idea how safe the product could be made.
215
3. Pure Consumer Expectations
A few jurisdictions have taken the consumer expectations standard of
defectiveness at its word and have concluded that the only relevant inquiry is
whether the product is dangerous beyond the expectations of an ordinary
consumer.216 In Lester v. Magic Chef217 and Rahmig v. Mosley Machinery
Co.,28 Kansas and Nebraska courts, respectively, rejected the concept that
design defectiveness depends on the relative weights of the product's risk and
its utility. In Lester, the court upheld the trial judge's refusal to give the jury
the risk-utility test instruction requested by the plaintiff, and it approved a
consumer expectation test instruction modeled after Section 402A, comment
i.219
211 Id.
212 Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 879 (Ariz. 1985).
213 Id. at 878.
214 Id. at 879-80.
215 Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 573 P.2d 443,454 (Cal 1978) (quoting Wade,
Strict Tort Liability for Products, supra note 79 at 829).
216SeeLester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 641 P.2d 353 (Kan. 1982); Rahmig v. Mosley Mach.
Co., 412 N.W.2d 56 (Neb. 1987). See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(2)
(1992)(incorporating consumer expectations test).
217 641 P.2d 353 (Kan. 1982). See also Donna Fowler, Comment, Products Liability:
Kansas Adopts the Consumer Expectations Test to Define "Unreasonably Dangerous" in
Design Defect Cases, 22 WASHBURN L. J. 397 (1983).
218 412 N.W.2d 56 (Neb. 1987).
219 Lester, 641 P.2d at 361 ( trial judge instructed jury that a product is unreasonably
dangerous if it is dangerous beyond the expectations of an ordinary consumer with knowledge
common to the community regarding the product's characteristics). See also Wheeler v. John
Deere Co., 862 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir. 1988) (reaffirming Lester).
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Likewise, the Nebraska Supreme Court has concluded that in a design
defect case "Nebraska still adheres to the user-contemplation test generally
reflected in [Section 402A] and has not.., adopted the risk-utility test."" 0
The court stressed that the plaintiff is not required to present evidence of a
safer alternative design as part of his design defect claim.1' As a practical
matter, however, plaintiffs in both cases presented evidence of a safer feasible
alternative design in support of their claims." This approach has been
heavily criticized and it represents only a small minority position.
D. THE BARKER Two-PRONG APPROACH
In Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 223 the California Supreme Court
combined the risk-utility test and the consumer expectations test to produce a
hybrid two-prong test for determining design defects. Under the first prong,
a product may be found defective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates that
the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect
when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner. Under the
second prong, a product may be found defective if the plaintiff proves that its
design proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to prove that, on
balance, the benefits of the challenged design outweigh its inherent risk of
danger. 4 While California recently limited the application of the first prong
of the Barker analysis, the original formulation of the test has been adopted
and applied in Alaska 6 and Hawaii.227
The Barker test allows the trier of fact to find a product defective in
design under either the consumer expectations test or the risk-utility test.
Thus, a product may be found defective under the consumer expectations
prong even though it is found not to be defective under the risk-utility test. 1
8
Likewise, a product maybe defective in design, even if it satisfies the expecta-
tions of the ordinary consumer, if the defendant fails to show that, on balance,
20 Rahmig, 412 N.W.2d at 78. See also Adams v. American Cyanamid, 498 N.W. 2d
579.
2" Rahmig, 412 N.W. 2d at 82, overruling Nerud v. Haybuster Mfg., 340 N.W.2d 869
(Neb. 1983).
' Lester, 641 P.2d at 354; Rhamig, 412 N.W.2d at 65.
2'3 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
24 Id. at 457-58.
m Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994).
n6 See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co., v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979), appeal after
remand 624 P.2d 790 (1981).
227 See, e.g., Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hosp. Inc., 659 P.2d 743 (Haw. 1983).
m See, e.g., Curtis v. State, 180 Cal. Rptr. 843 (Cal. App. 1982).
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the benefits of the challenged design outweighed its inherent risks.? 9 This
second path to liability protects consumers in situations where the obvious
nature of the danger renders the product's performance in conformity with the
ordinary consumer's expectations, but its design nevertheless subjects the user
to "excessive preventable harm. 230  Where the defect goes beyond the
common experience and knowledge of consumers, however, the consumer
expectations test may not be available, and the design will be evaluated under
the risk-utility test.21
While the alternative prongs are based on the commonly applied versions
of the risk-utility and consumer expectations tests, they depart from their
traditional formulations in two significant ways. First, the court distinguished
its formulation of the risk-utility prong by shifting the burden of proof from
the plaintiff to the manufacturer. Under this approach, if the plaintiff estab-
lishes that his injuries were proximately caused by the product's design, the
manufacturer must establish that the product's benefits outweighed the risks
of danger inherent in its design.2 2 To aid in this analysis, the court in Barker
suggested a set of factors the trier of fact may consider in determining whether
the manufacturer satisfied his burden of proof. 3 While this approach does
not require the plaintiff to offer evidence of the availability of a feasible and
practical alternative design as part of his claim, the majority of plaintiffs
introduce such evidence as a practical matter to establish proximate
causation.234
Second, although the Barker court relied on Section 402A in formulating
its version of the consumer expectations test, it expressly rejected the require-
229 See, e.g., Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 649 P.2d 224 (Cal. 1982).
22o Barker v. Lull Eng. Co., Inc., 573 P.2d at 454.
2' See, e.g., Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d at 308.
2 2 Barker v. Lull Eng. Co., Inc., 573 P.2d at 443. The rationale given by the court for
this approach is that one of the principal purposes behind strict liability is to relieve the plaintiff
of many of the "onerous evidentiary burdens inherent in a negligence cause of action." Id. at
455.
233 The list suggested by the Barker court is based on the Wade factors. The factors
suggested by the court are: "the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the
likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design,
the financial cost of as improved design, and the adverse consequences to the product and to'
the consumer that would result from an alternative design." Id. at 455
4 The cases suggest that plaintiffs try to prove proximate cause by introducing evidence
which tends to show that adopting a different design would have avoided or reduced the risk of
harm. See, e.g., Id. at. 447 (plaintiff's expert testified that "the loader should have been
equipped with 'outriggers' to increase stability); Bernal v. Richard Wolf Med. Inst. Corp., 272
Cal. Rptr. 41 (Cal. App. 1990) (presenting testimony that surgical scissors used in knee surgery
were subject to "stress corrosion" cracking and that a reasonable alternative design was
possible); Arthur v. Avon Inflatables, Ltd., 302 Cal. Rptr 1 (Cal. App. 1984) (plaintiff presented
evidence of how a life raft could have been equipped).
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ment that plaintiff prove that the product was "unreasonably dangerous."235
Under the Barker formulation, the plaintiff only needs to prove that he used
the product in an intended or reasonably foreseeable way, and that the product
failed to perform safely? 1 6 The proponents of this hybrid approach argue that
it combines the most workable features of the two tests, while at the same
time disposing with their more cumbersome and doctrinally inconsistent
aspects. 7
E. REASONABLY PRUDENT MANUFACTURER TEST
The test as to whether a product is defective in design is frequently stated
in terms of whether the manufacturer's decisions in designing the product
were reached in areasonablyprudent manner. This approach is often referred
to as the "reasonably prudent manufacturer test." '38 Although it is not labeled
a risk-utility test, a determination as to whether the manufacturer acted
reasonably necessarily involves a balancing of the product's risks against its
benefits or utility. 9 In fact, most jurisdictions applying this formulation
require evidence of the availability of a reasonable, practical alternative design
at the time of manufacture before they will impose liability.24 The test then
becomes whether "an ordinarily prudent company.., being fully aware of the
risk, would not have put [the product] on the market.
241
In evaluating a product's design based on the reasonably prudent
manufacturer standard, these courts condition liability upon concepts of
responsibility and fault.242 Nonetheless, some courts label their analysis as
one of strict liability and differentiate it from negligence by imputing to the
manufacturer the information about the product's dangers which is available
at the time of trial.243 These courts shift the focus of the trier of fact's inquiry
23' Barker v. Lull Eng. Co., Inc., 573 P.2d at 451. See also Ontai v. Straub Clinic &
Hosp. Inc., 659 P.2d 734, 739 (Haw. 1983).
236 See, e.g., Caterpillar, 593 P.2d at 885.
237 M. STEWART MADDEN, PRODucTs LIABILITY § 6.10 (2d ed. 1988).
"3 See ag., Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., Inc., 602 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1980); Church
v. Wesson, 385 S.E.2d 393 (W. Va. 1989). This approach is most often associated with Deans
Wade and Keeton. W. Page Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of the Defect, 5 ST.
MARY'S L.L 30, 38 (1973); Wade, Strict Liability for Products, supra note 79.
239 See, e.g., Leathern v. Moore, 265 So.2d 270 (La. App. 1972); Volkswagen of
America, Inc. v. Young, 321 A.2d 737 (Md. 1972).
240 See, e.g., Peppin v. W.H. Brady Co., 372 N.W.2d 369 (Minn. App. 1985).
24 Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., Inc., 602 S.W.2d 429,433 (Ky. 1980).
242 See, e.g., Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176 (Mich. 1984). See generally,
Wade, Strict Liability for Products, supra note 79.
'3 See, e.g., id. See generally, supra notes 157-164, and accompanying text
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from the manufacturer's conduct onto the product, by burdening the manufac-
turer with what amounts to constructive knowledge of the dangerous condi-
tion.2' In design defect cases, however, this approach remains fundamentally
equivalent to pure negligence analysis.245
ILI
RESTATEMENT (THIRD): RESTATEMENT OR REFORM?
This part of the Note analyzes the extent to which the design defect
standard contained in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
accurately reflects the law of the fifty states. Historically, design defect
litigation has been best characterized by numerous cases and articles that have
reached conflicting results.246 In recent years, however, the law has reached a
surprising national consensus regarding the way in which the vast majority of
states treat such problems. 47 After decades of expanding the legal rights of
the consumer vis d vis the manufacturer and retailer, judicial and legislative
attitudes regarding design defect liability finally shifted toward a more
balanced approach.24 A consideration of these issues, as well as an evalua-
tion of the states' approaches to design defects reveals that the functional
approach proposed by the Reporters is an appropriate standard of liability to
be applied to manufacturers' design choices.
A. CRITICISM OF THE PROPOSED APPROACH
The debate over the accuracy and pro-business tendencies of the new
Restatement's design defect section began even before the Reporters com-
24Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974).
245 See, e.g., Wade, Strict Liability for Products, supra note 79; Birnbaum, supra note
11, at 618-22 (evaluating the prudent manufacturer test and concluding that it is "substantially
coordinate with liability on negligence principles").
246 E.g., compare Prentis v. Yale Mfg., 365 N.W.2d 176, 186 (1984) (adopts a pure
negligence, risk-utility test in products liability actions predicated upon defective design) with
Beacon Bowl v. Wisconsin Elec. Power, 501 N.W.2d 788, 908 (Wis. 1993) (whether a product
is defectively designed depends upon the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer);
and compare Birnbaum, supra note 11 with Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer
Protection: Doctrine, Function, and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L.
REV. 1109 (1974).
247 See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in
Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479 (1990).
4 See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier, supra note 40, at 1315. See
also Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products
Liability, 39 UCLAL. REv. 731 (1992); James A. Henderson, Jr., & Theodore Eisenberg, The
Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L.
REv. 479 (1990).
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menced their task. When the Reporters were appointed, a proposed revision
of Section 402A by professors Henderson and Twerski2 49 and their other prior
works immediately raised concerns about the objectivity of the new Restate-
ment. 50 The criticism intensified after the Reporters published "Preliminary
Draft No. 1" on April 20, 1993, 5' and again increased after the publication of
"Tentative Draft No. 1."252
The debate surrounding the new Restatement, while centering on the
accuracy of the proposed test for design defects, concerned two distinct issues.
Foremost, critics argued that the rejection of the consumer expectation test as
an independent determinant of design fitness is inconsistent with current law.
The risk-utility balancing test, critics contended, was the law in a minority of
jurisdictions.2 3 Moreover, some of the commentators and practitioners who
agreed with the test in principle disagreed as to the propriety of requiring
plaintiffs to show that a reasonable alternative design would have reduced the
overall risk of injury.2"4
The second point of contention was the Reporters' express acknowledg-
ment that defective design liability is predicated on negligence principles.
Although comment a to Section One states that the liability for each form of
249 James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twersid, A Proposed Revision supra note 8.
250 See James A. Henderson Jr., Revising Section 402,4: The Limits of Tort as Social
Insurance, 10 TOURO L. REV. 107, 111-12 (1993) ("For years I had written what was widely
viewed, and I think fairly viewed, as pro-defendant material.") See, e.g., James A. Henderson
Jr., Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The Imprisonment of Corporate Reality, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 766 (1983) ("[e]xposing manufacturer's to product liability may be
counterproductive...'); James A. Henderson Jr., Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective
Product Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REV. 773
(1978-79); see also Already on the Record, LEGAL TIMES, June 8, 1992, at 3 (reporting
allegations that Professors Henderson and Twerski are pro-business in philosophy and are
financially backed by business concers).
25'Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (Prelim. Draft No. 1, Apr. 20, 1993).
For criticism of the preliminary draft, see Roland F. Banks & Margaret O'Connor, Restating
the Restatment (Second), Section 402A -Design Defect, 72 OREGON L. REV. 411 (1993).
252 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTs: PRODUCTS LIABiLiY (Preliminary Draft No.
1, 1993).
253 See, e.g., Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability,
Section 2(B): Design Defect, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 167 (1995)(arguing that a majority of
jurisdictions do not support the risk-utility test in design defect cases); Roland F. Banks &
Margaret O'Connor, Restating the Restatement (Second), Section 402A - Design Defect, 72
OR. L. REv. 411 (1993)(arguing that consumer expectations is the majority approach).
254 See, e.g., Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
Section 2(b): The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1407
(1994)(arguing that the reasonable alternative design requirement is not supported by modem
case law); Larry S. Stewart, Plaintiffs Bar Questions Products Liability Restatement, NAT'L
L.J. (Aug. 1, 1994); ALI Hesitates on Lawyer Liability, Products Liability Restatement
Efforts, 62 U.S.L.W. 2734 (May 31, 1994).
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defect is defined in functional terms, critics charged that reintroducing
negligence into products liability would erode consumers' rights.2" Plaintiffs'
attorneys were worried that the Reporters would set out to reform the law and
would significantly curb, if not reverse, the expansion of consumers' rights
experienced in recent decades.256
Despite the intensity of the criticism, only one study purports at present
to analyze the law of the states to discern the majority approach to defective
design liability. Subsequent to the Reporters' publication of "Preliminary
Draft No. 1" of the new Restatement, attorneys Roland F. Banks and Marga-
ret O'Connor published a study in which they conclude that "[a] large
majority of cases which have addressed this issue have held that a design
defect is to be determined by the consumer expectations test of Section
402A." '257 The study looked at a total of thirty-eight states, and concluded
that nineteen of them follow the consumers expectation test.2 8 The study
concluded that a risk-utility balancing test is accepted only in seven states, 9
and that ten states recognize both tests.260 Two states were categorized as
miscellaneous.
26,
While Banks and O'Connor noted that "[m]ost courts also seem to view
negligence as a necessary ingredient in determining if a particular product
design is acceptable,' 262 they concluded that negligence concepts "have never
been by themselves liability rules, and the courts have not treated them as
such. ' 263 Banks and O'Connor concluded the study by proposing their own
strict liability standard for defective design, which attempts to assimilate their
2'5 Larry S. Stewart, Plaintiffs Bar Questions Products Liability Restatement, NAT'L L.J
(Aug. 1 1994).
256 ALl Hesitates on Lawyer Liability, Products Liability Restatement Efforts, 62
U.S.L.W. 2734 (May 31, 1994).
257 Banks & O'Connor, supra note 3, at 415.
"I Alabama, Arkasas, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas,
Maryland, Nebraska, Neveda, North Dacota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin. Id. at 415-416.
11 Colorado, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and New
Mexico. Id.
260 Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, New York, Ohio, and
Washington. Id.
1' Minnesota and North Carolina. Id.
262 Id. at 420.
2 3 Id. at 417.
[Vol.2:239
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS
conclusions. 64 This Note suggests that those conclusions were based on a
merely superficial examination of the law of the states.
B. EVALUATING CASE LAW SUPPORT FOR THE PROPOSED APPROACH
The new Restatement's standard for design defect liability should, if
possible, be a restatement of the approaches to this issue adopted by the
various jurisdictions. This part of the Note summarizes the approaches taken
by the fifty states and concludes that the design defect standard of the new
Restatement does, indeed, meet this criterion.
1. Risk-Utility v. Consumer Expectations
The new Restatement establishes risk-utility balancing as the governing
standard for liability in design defect cases, and it imposes upon the plaintiff
the burden of showing that the adoption of a reasonable alternative design
would have eliminated or reduced the harm.265 Where the product's design
causes it to fail its intended function and the defect is obvious, the new
Restatement allows the plaintiff to take advantage of an inference of defect,
thereby arguing that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary
consumer would expect. 266 This approach is in agreement with the state of
existing case law. A majority of states have held that the issue of design
defectiveness is to be determined, in most instances, on the basis of risk-utility
or cost-benefit analysis. Courts in Alabama,
267 Arizona 268 California, 269
I Banks and O'Connor suggest that design defect liability be imposed
... if the condition in the product which caused the harm would not have been
contemplated bythe ordinary person who would be expected to use or consume the
product, and a reasonably prudent seller of like products, knowing the risk of harm
involved, would not have marketed the product under the circumstances existing at
the time.
Id. at 418.
21 See Tentative Draft No. 2, § 2(b).
See supra Part I.B.
267 See, e.g., Townsend v. General Motors Corp., 642 So. 2d 411, 418 (Ala. 1994);
Casrell v. Altec Indus., 335 So. 2d 128 (Ala. 1976).
'8 See, e.g., Dart v. Wiebe Mfg, Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 879 (Ariz. 1985).
'
9 See, e.g., Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994).
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Colorado,2 7 ° Delaware,27 1 the District of Columbia, 27 2 Florida,273 Georgia,274
Idaho,27  Illinois,2 76  Indiana, 277  Kentucky,
27  Louisiana,27 9  Maine,280
Maryland, 28' Massachusetts, 282 Michigan,
2 3 Minnesota, 284 Mississippi, 25
Montana, 286 New Hampshire, 287 New Jersey,
288 New Mexico, 289 New York,290
7OSee, e.g., Bond v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 686 P.2d. 1114, 1118 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1993); and White v. Caterpillar, Inc., 867 P.2d 100, 105 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
271 See, e.g., Nacci v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 325 A.2d 617 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
See, e.g., Hull v. Eaton, 825 F.2d 448, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1987)(Stating that "the District
of Columbia would follow the risk-utility balancing test referred to by the Maryland courts.").
2 See, e.g., Radiation Technology, Inc. v. Ware Const. Co., 445 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla.
1983).
274 See, e.g., Banks v. I.C.I. Americas, Inc., 1994 WL 677536 at 1 (Ga. 1994).
275 See, e.g., Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297, 307 (Idaho 1987).
276 See, e.g., Lamkin v. Towner, 563 N.E.2d 449, 457-58 (Ill. 1990); and Lease v.
International Harvester Co., 529 N.E.2d 57 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
277See, e.g., Pries v. Honda Motor Co., 31 F.3d 543, 546 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that in
design cases "Indiana requires the plaintiff to show that another design not only could have
prevented the injury but also was cost-effective under general negligence principles.").
27 See, e.g., Nichols v. Union Underware Co., 602 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Ky. 1980) (the
court proposed the following jury instruction: "You will find for the plaintiff only if you are
satisfied from the evidence that the material of which the T-shirt was made created such a risk
of its being accidentally set on fire by a child wearing it that an ordinarily prudent company
engaged in the manufacture of clothing, being fully aware of the risk, would not have put it on
the market; otherwise, you will find for the defendant.").
279 See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2800.56.
280 See, e.g., St. Germain v. Husqvarna Corp., 544 A.2d 1283, 1286 (Me. 1988).
2' See, e.g., Ziegler v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus. Ltd., 539 A.2d 701, 704-705 (Md. App.
1988) ("[1n a design defect case, § 402A requires 'a weighing of the utility of risk inherent in
the design against the magnitude of the risk."')(quoting Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363
A.2d 955 (Md. 1976).
282 Massachusetts does not recognize strict liability in tort, but the implied warranties of
Massachusetts' version of the U.C.C. provide a remedy which is "congruent in nearly all
respects" with strict liability. Back v. Wickes, 378 N.E.2d 964, 969 (Mass. 1978). See, e.g.,
Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1990) (applying Massachusetts'
version of the U.C.C. law).
2" See, e.g., Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 186 (Mich. 1984).
214 See, e.g., Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 96 (Minn. 1987); Holm v.
Sponco Mfg., 324 N.W.2d 207, 212-213 (Minn. 1982).
suSee, e.g., MIss. CODE. ANN. § 11-1-63 (1993); and Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage,
617 So.2d 248, 253 (Miss. 1993).
'See, e.g., Rixv. GeneralMotors Corp., 723 P.2d 195, 202 (Mont. 1986); and Krueger
v. General Motors Corp., 783 P.2d 1340, 1345 (Mont. 1989).
287 See, e.g., Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 846 (N.H. 1978).
.See, eg., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3-a(1) (West 1987); and Smith v. Keller Ladder
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North Carolina,291 Pennsylvania, 29 2 Rhode Island 293 South Carolina,
294
Texas,2 95 Utah,29 6 Washington 297 and Wyoming2 98 follow this rule. In several
of these jurisdictions, if the defect is obvious and falls within the common
experience of product users, defectiveness of the product's design can be
determined based upon consumer expectations.299
The only serious alternative to such an approach is application of the
consumer expectations test regardless of the nature of the design defect.
Based on the author's review of the case law, this Note concludes that the
courts in a majority of states which apply the consumer expectations test
actually use a risk-utility analysis to determine what reasonable expectations
Co., 645 A.2d 1269 (N.J. Super 1994).
' Sep_ eg., Supreme Court Rules Annotated, Uniform Civil Jury Instructions, 13-1407
(1986); Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, 560 P.2d 934, 938 (N.M. 1977).
290 See, e.g., Voss v. Black & Decker, 450 N.E.2d 204, 208 (N.Y. 1983); Garcia v.
Rivera, 553 N.Y.S.2d 378, 380 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
21, North Carolina does not recognize strict liability in tort. See, e.g., McCollum v. Grove
Mfg. Co., 293 S.E.2d 632, 638 (N.C. App. 1982) (The Court noted that "[i]n products liability
cases, the duty of the manufacturer must be determined by the principles of negligence."), affd,
300 S.E.2d 374 (1983).
29 See, e.g., Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co., 391 A.2d 1020, 1026 (Pa. 1978).
293 See, e.g., Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 781 (R.I. 1988).
4 See, e.g., Claytor v. Genral Motors Corp., 286 S.E.2d 129, 132 (S.C. 1982).
295 See, e.g., Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex. 1979).
296 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §78-15-6(2) (1992).
297 See, e.g., Seattle-FirstNat'l ank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (Wash. 1975).
298 See, e.g., Sims v. General Motors Corp., 751 P.2d 357 (Wyo. 1988).
9 See, eg., Dart v. Wiebe Mfg, Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 878 (Ariz. 1985) (design defective-
ness evaluated using a risk-utility analysis where the nature of the defect is beyond the
expectations of the ordinary consumer because he would have no idea how safe the product
could be made); Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994) (holding
consumer expectations prong inapplicable in cases where "the issue of design defect goes
beyond the common experience of the product's users.").
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are.300 Thus, in Iowa, 30' New York,30 2 Oregon,30 3 and Washington, 304 risk-
utility analysis and consumer expectations are one and the same.
Overall, thirty-one states support the position of the new Restatement,
whereas only Arkansas, 305 Connecticut,
30 6 Kansas,307 Nebraska,308 Nevada,30 9
North Dakota,310 Oklahoma, 31" South Dakota,31
2 Tennessee,313 Vermont, 314
and Wisconsin315 apply consumer expectations without weighing the prod-
" See notes 193-198, and accompanying text.
30 See, e.g., Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., Inc., 268 N.W.2d 830, 834-35 (Iowa
1978).
'See, e.g., Voss v. Black & Decker, 450 N.E.2d 204, 208 (N.Y. 1983) ("We have held
that a defectively designed product is one which...is in a condition not reasonably contemplated
by the ultimate consumer and is unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; that is one whose
utility does not outweigh the danger inherent in introduction onto the stream of commerce.").
303 See note 190, and accompanying text.
304 See, e.g. Estate of Ryder v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 587 P.2d 160, 164 (Wash.
1979) (stating that risk-utility and consumer expectations are "but two sides of the same coin").
31 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116-102(7). See also Berkeley v. Reed-Joseph Land
Co., 653 S.W.2d 128 (Ark. 1983); and French v. Grove Mfg. Co., 656 F.2d 295 (8th Cir.
1982) (applying Arkansas law).
306 See, e.g., Giglio v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 429 A.2d 486, 488 (Conn.
1980); and Slepski v. Williams Ford, Inc., 364 A.2d 175, 178 (Conn. 1975).
307 See, e.g., Lester v. Magic Chef, 641 P.2d 353, 357 (Kan. 1982). See generally
Donna Fowler, Comment, Products Liability: Kansas Adopts the Consumer Expectations Test
to Defme "Unreasonably Dangerous" in Design Defect Cases, 22 WASBURN L.J. 397 (1983).
... See, e.g., Rahmig v. Mosley Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56, 78 (Neb. 1987).
3 See, e.g., Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 657 P.2d 95 (1983).
311 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE §28-01.1-05(2) (1991).
311 See, e.g., Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1362-63 (Okla. 1973).
See generally V. LAwRENCE-MAcDOUGA, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW IN OKLAHoMA 12 (1990)
(classifying Oklahoma as a "pure Restatement jurisdiction").
312 See, e.g., Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 205 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1973).
311 See, e.g., Gann v. International Harvester Co., 712 S.W.2d 100, 105 (Tenn. 1986)
(rejecting the risk-utility and reasonably prudent manufacturer tests).
314 See, e.g., Famham v. Bombardier, Inc., 640 A.2d 47, 48 (Vt 1994) (quoting Section
402, comment i).
315 See, e.g., Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 30 N.W.2d 2, 15 (Wis. 1984)
(The court concluded that "Wisconsin is committed to the consumer-contemplation test for
determining whether a product is defective.").
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uct's risks and utilities. Courts in Alaska, 16 Hawaii,31 7 and Ohio318 recognize
both risk-utility and consumer expectations as alternative tests.
2. Reasonable Alternative Design
Of the jurisdictions that apply some sort of risk-utility analysis to
identify defectiveness, most of them require plaintiffs to prove that an
alternative design, if adopted, would have eliminated or reduced the risk of
harm without making the product impractical or prohibitively expensive.
Such evidence is required by statute in Louisiana,319 Mississippi,320 New
Jersey,321 Ohio,322 Texas, 323 and Washington.324 In Alabama,325 Colorado,
26
316See, eg., CaterpillarTractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871,884-885 (Alaska 1979), affd
inpart, rev'din part, 624 P.2d 790 (1981).
317 See, e.g., Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566, 579 (Haw. 1989); and
Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hosp. Inc., 659 P.2d 734 (Haw. 1983).
318 See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.75(A) (Page 1991).
319 See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.56.
310 See eg., Mss. CODE. ANN. § 11-1-63 (1993) (plaintiff must prove that "there existed
a feasible design alternative that would to a reasonable probability have prevented the harm..
* without impairing the utility, practicality or desirability of the product to users or consumers.").
32' SeeN.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3-a(1) (West 1987). See also Smith v. Keller Ladder
Co., 645 A.2d 1269 (N.J. Super 1994) (requiring proof of a reasonable, safer alternative
design).
3
22 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.75(F). Subsection (F) reads:
A product is not defective in design or formulation if, at the time the product left the
control of its manufacturer, a practical and technically feasible alternative design or
formulation was not available that would have prevented the harm for which the claimant
seeks to recover compensatory damages without substantially impairing the usefulness
or intended purpose of the product, unless the manufacturer acted unreasonably in
introducing the product into trade or commerce.
Id.
321 See TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.005 (West 1993). Section 82.005
places on the plaintiff the burden to prove that there was a reasonable, safer alternative design
which "in reasonable probability would have prevented or significantly reduced the risks of the
claimant's [harm] without substantially impairing the product's utility; and [which] was
economically and technologically feasible at the time the product left the control of the
manufacturer or seller.•• ."
32 See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030(1). See also Couch v. Mine Safety Appliances
Co., 728 P.2d 585, 586 (Wash. 1986) (applying § 7.72.030(1)).
321 See, e.g., Townsend v. General Motors Corp., 642 So.2d 411, 418 (Ala. 1994)
(plaintiff must prove "that a safer, practical, alternative design was available to the manufac-
turer at the time it manufactured the [product]").
326 See, e.g., Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 184-85 (Colo. 1992) ("The
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Delaware,327 the District of Columbia,328 Florida,329 Georgia, 33°Illinois, 331
Indiana,332 Kentucky, 333 Massachusetts, 334 Michigan,335 Minnesota,3 6 Mon-
tana,337 New York,338 Oregon,339 and Pennsylvania,340 evidence of a safer
existence of a feasible alternative is a factor in the risk-benefit analysis of the unreasonable
dangerousness of the product design.").
3' Delaware does not recognize strict liability in tort. See, e.g., Nacci v. Volkswagen of
America, Inc., 325 A.2d 617, 620 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974) (A product is defectively designed
when its "design has created a risk of harm which is so probable that an ordinary prudent
person, acting as a manufacturer, would pursue a different available design which would
substantially lessen the probability of harm.").
32 See, e.g., Hull v. Eaton, 825 F.2d 448,454 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Applying Washington
D.C. law) (Defective design if "there was a feasible way to design a safer product and an
ordinary consumer would conclude that the manufacturer ought to have used that alternative
design.").
329 See, e.g., Radiation Technology, Inc. v. Ware Const. Co., 445 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla.
1983) (considering the manufacturer's "ability to eliminate or minimize the danger without
seriously impairing the product or making it unduly expensive.").
33mSee, e.g., Banks v. I.C.I. Americas, Inc., 1994 WL 677536 at 2 (Ga. 1994) (the court
formulated the inquiry as "whether the design chosen was a reasonable one from among the
feasible choices of which the manufacturer was aware or should have been aware.").
331 See, e.g., Lamkin v. Towner, 563 N.E.2d 449, 457-58 (Ill. 1990); and Lease v.
International Harvester Co., 529 N.E.2d 57 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
332 See, e.g., Jackson v. Warrum, 535 N.E.2d 1207, 1220 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) ("burden
of proof scheme" requires that "plaintiff must prove that a feasible safer alternative product
design existed.").
3 See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Rice, 775 S.W.2d 924,928-29 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).
334 See, e.g., Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1990) (applying
Massachusetts law)(A design defect case based on breach of warranty is dependent on proof of
the existence of a safer alternative design.).
331 See, e.g., Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 326 N.W.2d 372, 378-79 (Mich. 1982)
(defendant's motion for directed verdict granted after plaintiff failed to introduce evidence of
"the magnitude of the risks involved and the reasonableness of the proposed alternative
design").
31 See, e.g., Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 96 (Minn. 1987).
17 See, e.g., Rix v. General Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195, 202 (Mont. 1986) (a design is
unreasonably dangerous "if at the time of manufacture an alternative designed product would
have been safer than the original designed product and was both technologically feasible and a
marketable reality.").
338 See, e.g., Voss v. Black & Decker, 450 N.E.2d 204, 208 (N.Y. 1983) ("The plaintiff,
of course, is under an obligation to present evidence that the product, as designed, was not
reasonably safe because there was substantial likelihood of harm and it was feasible to design
the product in a safer manner.").
" See, e.g., Wood v. Ford Motor Cp., 691 P.2d 495, 498 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) ("Plaintiff
must show that an alternative safer design, practicable under the circumstances, was avail-
able.").
' See, eg., F'tzpatrick v. Madonna, 636 A.2d 322, 326 (Pa. Super. 1993)(holding boat
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reasonable alternative design is mandated by judicial decision. Moreover, the
absolute refusal by courts and legislatures to adopt categorical liability
suggests that all claims of defective design, in all jurisdictions, must be
supported by some evidence of a safer alternative design, whether such
evidence is explicitly required or not.
341
3. Negligence v. Strict Liability
The new Restatement establishes reasonableness as the governing
standard for liability in design defect cases, but it avoids using the language
of negligence and strict liability. Rather, the liability standards are set forth
in functional terms which directly address the nature of the design defect. The
abandonment of the strict liability label underscores the struggles of courts
and commentators to develop a strict liability theory of recovery for defec-
tively designed products. Courts in Alabama,342 Georgia, 
343 Michigan, 34"
Minnesota,3 45 and New York34 have admitted the futility of trying to graft a
theory of strict liability onto design defect claims, and have recognized that
design defect liability is predicated on negligence principles. Most courts
maintain, however, that their treatment of these claims is not inconsistent.
The most common way in which the courts differentiate negligence and strict
liability as applied to claims of defective design is by imputing to the manu-
facturer or seller the knowledge of the product's propensities to cause harm
propeller not defectively designed because no feasible alternative design was available);
Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 942 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying Pennsylvania law) ("If
no such alternative feasible design existed when the product was manufactured, then the design
cannot be said to be defective.").
14, See supra notes 118-142, and accompanying text.
342 See, e.g., Casrell v. Altec Indus., 335 So. 2d 128, 132 (Ala. 1976) (stating that
Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine incorporates much of the rationales and
terminology of the Section 402A but purports to retain the "fault" concept of a negligence
action).
141 See, e.g., Banks v. I.C.I. Americas, Inc., 1994 WL 677536 at I (Ga. 1994) (stating
that whether a product is defectively designed is determined on the basis of a risk-utility
analysis, which incorporates the concept of "reasonableness").
3See, eg., Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 186 (Mich. 1984) (adopting "a
pure negligence, risk-utility test in products liability actions against ... where liability is
predicated upon defective design.").
14 See, e.g., Holm v. Sponco Mfg., 324 N.W.2d 207,212-213 (Minn. 1982) (adopting
a "reasonable care" balancing test for design defectiveness).
3 See, e.g., Opera v. Hyva, Inc., 86 A.D.2d 373 (N.Y. App. 1982) ("Defective design
cases are thus similar to negligence cases and the standards for imposing liability for design
defects are general negligence principles.").
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which was available at the time of the trial.347 This approach, however, is less
than satisfactory.
Theoretically, focusing on the product's quality at the time of the trial
can strip the inquiry of any notions of negligence and fault. The critics of this
position argue, however, that drawing such semantic distinctions does not
change what is fundamentally a negligence analysis,3 48 and that these distinc-
tions only needlessly confuse the jury's task in determining liability.349 After
all, if the product's ultimate quality is a direct function of the manufacturer's
conduct, any analysis focusing on the product itself will invariably implicate
the conduct of the manufacturer in designing it. In fact, by inviting the trier of
fact to balance factors concerning the manufacturer's conduct and judgment,
the risk-utility test necessarily reduces the analysis to one of reasonableness.
Moreover, the overwhelming consensus among jurisdictions that
plaintiffs must introduce some evidence of the availability of a safer, practical
alternative design before liability is imposed specifically focuses the inquiry
upon the manufacturer's decision to reject such alternatives.350 There is no
way to compare the risks and benefits of alternative designs without question-
ing the appropriateness of the design ultimately selected by the manufacturer.
Since the manufacturer's ability to, and decision not to, reduce the unsafe
character of the product is evaluated based on information available at the
time the decision was made, the evaluation is fundamentally a negligence
analysis.35' Thus, even though plaintiffs may be afforded the help of imputed
knowledge of dangerous characteristics, the fact that they must prove what
amounts to negligence by the manufacturer in designing the product further
reduces the significance of drawing a distinction between negligence and strict
liability in design defect cases.
CONCLUSION
Despite the A.L.I.'s adoption of Tentative Draft No. 2, the debate as to
the appropriate standard to govern manufacturers' liability for their design
choices is unlikely to cease. The normative desirability of a fault-based
147 See notes 157-164.
348 See L. Frumer & M. Friedman, Products Liability § 3.03[4], at 3-615 (1989);
Birnbaum, supra note 11, at 609-10.
"9See, e.g., Prentis v. Yale Mfg., 365 N.W.2d 176, 184 (Mich. 1984) (the court stated
that "in so doing in the context of [design defect] cases... we have engaged in a process that
may have served to confuse, rather than enlighten, jurors .... ); Birnbaum, supra note 11, at
601.
350 See, e.g., Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697 F.2d 1192, 1197 (4th Cir. 1982);
Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204,208 (N.Y. 1983).
' See Birnbaum, supra note 11. See also John W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of
Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 14-15 (1965).
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standard aside, however, the Draft's approach accurately reflects the dominant
trend in American products liability law. That trend is the result of a growing
recognition that the due care a manufacturer exercises in deciding whether to
adopt a particular design among available alternatives is an intrinsic part of its
final product. In evaluating the condition of the final product for the purposes
of imposing liability, the trier of fact must necessarily consider the reason-
ableness of the manufacturer's conduct in making the design selection in
question. Thus, the design defect section of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability is an accurate Restatement of design defect law, in that it
does not represent an attempt to engage in academic tort reform.
Michael J Thke

